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EDITORIAL

To all our readers we wish a happy Christmas. To many it cannot fail to be a time of anxiety: those of the clergy, especially, who live in the midst of agricultural or industrial depression are feeling the full force of hard times. Hope lies not only in the steps which statesmen may take to restore confidence among the nations—though there are welcome signs there: it lies far more in the great truth of the Incarnation which Christmas proclaims, the truth that this bewildered and unstable world is none the less a world which God has redeemed. Our hope rests, that is to say, on something done, and springs not out of a shallow optimism but out of a deep thanksgiving. The leaven of God's word and grace is already working in the lump of mankind, and is transforming and quickening it, through whatever discipline of distress or difficulty we need, into something more worthy of His manifest blessing. We walk by faith, not by sight, and are called to a perfecting of holiness in the fear of God—that same fear which Mary had when she heard the angel's message, and which accompanies every divine promise and call made by God to his Church on earth. The birth of new spiritual powers within her may well be nearer than we know.

With this issue we complete the twenty-fifth volume of THEOLOGY; and we shall hope to open our next volume with a fresh acquisition of strength in the editorial department. Meanwhile we hope that our present subscribers will not fail to renew their subscriptions at the New Year. As each New Year has begun, we have found that we have lost very few subscribers, and their places have quickly been taken. But economic circumstances undoubtedly make the present time a testing time. Throughout the last two years our circulation has remained remarkably steady, and we trust that in the coming year its curve will once again begin to move upward.

THE THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MORALITY (II)

WE have previously attempted to treat of God as vindicator of the reality of moral obligation, but His intimate connection with morality may be brought to light in a somewhat different way. We may consider the view we take of ourselves when our performance has not been in conformity with our moral judgment. There is little doubt that in the more trivial matters of life we feel far less concerned about conduct which is the infringement of a bye-law, a statute, or a convention than about actions which are actually displeasing or injurious to another person, and this feeling is greatly heightened if that person be a friend or superior, or both. But in cases where we have offended against our moral judgment our feeling is far more of the latter type than the former. If our offence were simply against an impersonal law or standard or against "our own best selves," it is hard to account for the obstinate recurrence of self-condemnation, for the sense of the indelibility of guilt, and for the demand for our own punishment. If, however, moral failure is regarded as a movement towards breaking up a personal relationship, and that a relationship with one who is infinitely our superior, and who is, in the deepest sense of the word, our friend, then these symptoms can be explained. Though many moral philosophers have understated or neglected the sense of personal guilt, and though men who boast of their common-sense attitude may deny that they have experienced it, it is widely enough spread abroad, at any rate in its rudimentary forms. Many, indeed, fail to recognize it for what it is owing to the diversity of its appearances: to one man it will strike home sharply and vividly in connection with a single act, as in the case of St. Augustine and the pears; to others it will remain a vague feeling of dissatisfaction with the unworthiness of their way of life, such as was felt by Sydney Carton. Any view of morality which dismisses our past wrongdoing as misdemeanours to be forgotten as soon as possible, or cancelled out by strenuous moral effort; any explanation of it as mere atavistic reversion or the determined product of an infinite number of causes, must simply ignore the persistence of our self-reproach.

It would be manifestly an unwarrantable claim to assert that this human phenomenon (which cannot be demonstrated even to be universal) guarantees the existence of God, but it may strengthen preceding arguments, and further afford some clue to His character.

Thus "the great indignation of God against sinners" (to quote the Prayer Book Communion Service) is not something of which men learn with surprise, but is witnessed to by their own hearts. The demand for punishment in the first place comes from themselves. The insistence and inappeasability of our self-condemnation (different in kind from our apprehension about the anger of a human being, able only to apply external compulsion to us) is such as to indicate that it is conditioned by the existence of an utterly Perfect Being, whose very nature is a reproach to us. "He is of purer eyes than to behold evil." "Wrath" and "indignation" are not too strong terms to express the utter incompatibility of the Righteous with the unrighteous. There is no cause, then, to deny the goodness of God because of this His indignation; it is rather the outcome of His righteousness. A man who has looked into himself and admitted that his wrong-doing deserves punishment can only say that it is unjust for God to condemn all sinners, if he is prepared to suppose a radical difference between himself and the rest of mankind.

Nor can we deny that pure justice implies retribution. Orderly requital signalizes the great gulf between a state of society where there is a sense of justice and one where there is not. It is just not indiscriminate blood-thirstiness that makes the Psalmist wish "to see the reward of the ungodly," but a conviction of the essential sanctity of the laws which they have broken, and which he wishes at all costs to see maintained. The simple remission of penalty makes the offence in question seem less grave than before. *Χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά.* Moral standards are maintained only at the cost of blood and tears; but not mainly those of delinquents, chiefly rather of those who live up to them or attempt to live up to them.

Righteousness has its being only through the tribute of suffering paid to it in their different ways by good and bad. If the bad, after failing to pay the tribute in the same way that the good have paid it, were by a "fiat" to be brought into exactly the same condition as the good, a slur would be cast on the value of the sacrifice actually made by the latter. But of course the main difficulty is to see how such a change could really be brought about by a "fiat."

So reflection upon the human sense of self-condemnation leads to the view that it can be done away neither by treatment as non-existent, nor by a mere sentence of forgiveness. A place is thus prepared for the Christian doctrine of forgiveness of sins made possible by the Atonement. But thought concerning morality can only lead to an admission of the need and suitability of an atonement, never to the categorical assertion that atonement was made by a definite historical personage.

To the consideration of such possibilities are we led by contemplation of our past: but the future, too, has to be faced, and the man who harbours in his mind the most perfect conception of right conduct cannot be certain that he will act in accordance with his conception. However commonplace it may seem, the fact must be insisted upon: man does not perform what he thinks he fully approves of. Where is he, then, to find an adequate motive?

The traditional doctrine of Christianity has been that God supplies grace to enable men to accomplish that which of their own strength they would be unable to perform. Philosophers, mistrustful of various forms which the doctrine has assumed, such as the mediation of grace by material things, by a sacred book, by intercourse with other persons, have often completely failed to supply a stimulus sufficient to secure that men should act in accordance with their own moral insight.

It is just possible that the persistence with which some philosophers try to show that some right course of action will be to the good of the agent (for example, Butler or T. H. Green), where it is by no means *prima facie* obvious that it will be so, is due to an underlying conviction that such a demonstration will compel a man to follow that course.

It is doubtful, however, if it is a sound conviction. There is no need to decide here whether, or in what sense, the practice of morality is conducive to the happiness of a man; but it is fairly certain from experience that assurance on this point will not necessarily be the determining factor in a man's conduct.

The conception, then, of a divine initiative and intervention, which is not part of the natural order of the universe, may be unwelcome to the mind trained in philosophy, but the consequences of its denial must be recognized.

It seems that there are several possibilities open:

- (1) That aid can be obtained from some human or infra-human source.
- (2) That a man can help himself.
- (3) That God bestows grace.
- (4) That there is no sort of aid available.

(1) may be true; but the problem is only shelved. We have to ask what the source of strength of our human assistant may be. And only in a savage community would an infra-human source be thought possible. (2) must be treated more seriously. Let us suppose a man to consider himself self-sufficient in the sense not of being able to supply his own material wants, but of having the power within himself always to pursue that which his moral judgment informs him to be right. Can this supposition be considered a reasonable one? A man can with a

moderate degree of certainty take stock of himself; the old proverb, *γνώθι σεαυτόν*, can to a certain extent be obeyed. He may get to know his own habits and dispositions, his preferences, his mental and bodily skill. But, as he faces the future, he can form no estimate at all of the circumstances, difficulties and opportunities that he is likely to encounter. Thus any proposition about his ability to act rightly in the time to come is concerned with the impact upon a (relatively) known of a totally unknown, and must be a matter not of knowledge but of opinion.

Hence it must be admitted that the untestable character of belief in divine grace, which is held to be so grave a hindrance to acceptance of such belief, is also exhibited by confidence in one's own powers of "rising to the occasion." Yet if (3) among the possibilities mentioned be held to be true, there will still be a lack of demonstrable knowledge, there will still be room for boundless agnosticism and refusal to dogmatize concerning the delimitations of the means (or occasions) of grace; but for guesswork about the interaction of impersonal and conflicting personal forces we shall have substituted faith in the action of a Personality, unified as no human personality is unified, in whose existence we have seen reason to believe, and whose character we thought to be expressed in a will for the perfect moralizing of the persons He has created. To what could the style of "a reasonable faith" be better given than to a belief that such a Personality will take action in pursuit of an end that is His own? For in the case of (2) we were concerned with only two factors: the make-up at a given moment of a single human personality and incalculable external circumstance; but in the case of (3) we are concerned with the same two factors, together with a transcendent personal Power. May not this third factor be conceived as annulling the incalculability of the second by foreseeing the need and supplying sufficient support to the human personality for it to be able to meet the unknown event?

(4), however, still remains as a possibility. It is true enough to say that we cannot make a leap from desirability to existence: that we must not suppose that because without divine grace no moral achievement is possible for us, therefore it must be actual. From the mere admission of man's need its satisfaction cannot be inferred. Nevertheless our reason previously given for believing in the existence of God was the inexorable claim of morality upon us, taken together with the fact of a natural order liable to bring confusion and misery as the crown of our best efforts. Our faith was that God so governs the world that the order of nature should not ultimately thwart the consciously willed morally good actions of persons. Therefore, since it is

on moral grounds that we have come to believe in God, should it be discovered that human beings are by themselves unable to attain even to the performance of such consciously willed morally good actions, it will surely be in accordance with those grounds to extend our conception of His activity to the bestowing of aid to facilitate such performance. Our belief in God rested *ab initio* upon conviction (not knowledge in the scientific sense) about morality; and we have no stronger or weaker grounds for believing in His gift of grace.

One sort of objection, however, we shall have to meet. It is a postulate of moral action by man that his will should be free. Indeed, some portion of this essay consisted in an attempt to rebut the claims made in the name of one of the sciences to render fruitless the consideration of morality by denying that postulate on grounds internal to the science. Yet it will be said that by insisting on the necessity of divine aid in moral action we are making man no longer a free agent.

The problem is intricate. To say, however, that a man needs grace in order to perform a right act is not to deny his freedom to perform that act. What is meant if it is said that he is not free to do it is that he is prevented by something not himself (and we must reckon his own body, in so far as it is a product of physical and chemical forces, as not himself)—by the working of a mechanical universe.

But supposing it to be proved beyond question that a man's actions are not predetermined by physical causes, it would not necessarily follow that there are no causes which, unless counterbalanced by grace, would render nugatory his efforts to lead a good life. There may well be social and personal influences which we cannot account for as simply physical, and which militate against virtuous performance; and these must be overcome by something of a spiritual kind which we call grace. If so, grace interferes, not with the physical ingredients of human action, but with such "determining causes" as hereditary influences, the "atmosphere" of surrounding society, past evil living, etc., none of which, except when twisted to fit a theory, can be set down as physical. Moreover, grace to be effective must be accepted by the individual, and in so doing he exercises his freedom, which consists, as we have said, in exemption from compulsion by what is external to himself. But grace, once accepted, is nothing alien, but part of himself. "And now I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."

Acceptance of the reality of grace can go far towards making intelligible and palatable that doctrine of man's immortality which is the last implication of morality with which we have to deal. For grace means the action of God upon us in the

course of this our terrestrial existence; so that this life in relationship with God having become habitual, its extension on the further side of death will appear no alien accretion, but a necessary culmination, if the work of grace begun here is not to be frustrated.

Immortality has been expounded as no more than a "corporate immortality"—that is, as the survival of the parent in the lives of his children and succeeding generations. It has also been regarded as the blessedness attainable in this life from contemplation of the universe from the standpoint of its Ultimate Cause, and as mere absorption into divinity. But to none of these conceptions does the consideration of morality lead.

Now the moral argument does not take its rise from the wide prevalence of the belief in personal immortality nor from the extreme desirability of existence continued beyond the grave; nor, again, is it to be confused with a "metaphysical" argument from the soul's being a simple substance, or with any of the arguments based upon supposed communications with the dead.

In the earlier part of this essay we put forward the view that rudimentary moral judgments are made in particular situations and that an ever-growing organization of moral judgments is made from these rudimentary ones. Afterwards it was argued that divine grace was required for us to be able to act in accordance with any of these judgments. It follows, then, since we make new judgments as a result of possessing a character formed not only by previous moral judgments, but by acting upon them, that our system of moral judgments, as well as our single virtuous actions, will be the work of grace—that is, of God.

It will be remembered that in considering reasons for believing in the existence of God we put forward in the first place the intractability of the natural order and its obstinate hostility to the realization of the values at which the moral life aimed. And we were forced to affirm the existence of an overruling and harmonizing power if the unconditional claims of morality were not to come to naught. Since then we have reached a conception of God as active in the moral life itself of each individual.

In a similar manner immortality may be exhibited as a postulate of the validity of the claims of morality, and also as something not external to, but part and parcel of the moral life itself.

Nothing, apparently, has less respect for the realization of a moral whole of life than the incidence of death. So far as

our labours have been directed towards the attainment of temporal well-being, not necessarily for ourselves but for others, or even for subsequent generations, that moment, coming upon us swiftly and unexpectedly, may stultify them all. If it be alleged that this is, after all, a secondary consideration, and that what matters supremely is the building up of our own characters, the objection will at once be raised that, without the postulate of immortality, it is our characters that death destroys—more effectively even than any of our half-finished works.

So our aim having been the building up and perfecting of character (the equivalent of what Kant would call "the perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law"), we should implicitly pass judgment on all those our laborious efforts as no more than vain pursuits of a will-o'-the-wisp, if we did not hold that the process was continued in a life beyond death, in a perpetuation of our personal identity. Character (not *mere* personal identity) is thus unique: a thing worth preserving at all times and under all circumstances. In illustration of this we may take the case of a priceless work of art, irretrievably destined to be destroyed by bombardment within a few hours. Under such conditions a man would hardly expose himself to pain and peril in order to preserve it from the ravages of damp, however great sacrifices he might make were there a possibility of the picture's preservation for posterity. Yet when the physician's sentence of death has gone forth, the man whose moralization has made any progress at all does not reckon with himself: "My character is about to be destroyed in a day or so; therefore what does it matter if I indulge my bodily passions or break some long-kept promise in the time left to me?" He that refuses to argue so acts upon the postulate that these actions are the true soul-destroyers and that death (not being *in pari materia* with them) has no such effect.

Enough has, perhaps, been said by now for a refutation to have been implicitly given to those who regard belief in immortality as a mere compensation for the ills of this life, a "hope of sinning hereafter." Such persons are in the habit of quoting: "Virtue is its own reward." This saying may be taken *au pied de la lettre* and affirmed by believers in immortality. Their belief is rendered necessary by the fragmentary character of all human virtue. They look for the reward of virtue not in those prizes which had to be disregarded in the course of its acquisition, but in the completion of virtue itself; and that is an end which the conditions of this earthly pilgrimage render unattainable.

Moreover, it is not necessary to conceive of the change occasioned by death as the tacking on, through an arbitrary

exercise of God's will, of a new piece of cloth to the old garment. For in our reflections upon divine grace we were dealing with a constant, everyday activity of God in the courses of the lives of those still travelling from the cradle to the grave. The presence and the work of God were found to be an indispensable element in those lives (except where they degenerated to mere fruitlessness and vanity), other elements being a physical environment and the influence of other human spirits. The result of dying is certainly a separation from "this mortal flesh" (whether a new physical environment is substituted or no). There is also the removal of the physical *media* of communication with other human spirits, so that (apart from belief in God) this other condition of earthly life seems to be removed by the fact of dying. But the relationship with God was never bound up with any of those circumstances which belong peculiarly to man's three score years and ten; for the most advanced sacramentalist will not contend that God is "tied" to the sacraments. This element, then, of the earthly self's environment need not be supposed to be removed by the incidence of death, and its continuance may be used to counteract any doubts which arise concerning the possibility of the persistence of a personal identity, where (apparently) all that was not-self has been removed from the self.

However, since (as a contemporary theologian* has put it) "to be truly moral and worth preserving personal life must be so involved in other lives and tasks that, if these were lost, all the best in the individual person would perish with them," we may well believe that in furtherance of this end the Divine Power will provide whatever means may be necessary to sustain this communion in substitution for the physical *media* of this world.

Finally, if we are to believe that such is the destiny of those whose lives have become God-centred while clothed in the flesh, the distinctness of morality from its opposite makes us conclude that those in whom that process has advanced here but little, or who have actively obstructed the working of divine grace, can only reach the state of union with God after pursuing a path of purgation, chastening, and suffering, or, it may be, not at all.†

R. L. COLE.

* Mr. J. S. Bezzant, of Exeter College, Oxford.

† The author desires to acknowledge his debt for much in this paper to Prof. Taylor's *The Faith of a Moralist*.

THE LAST THINGS*

THE question is being asked on every side: "To what do you attribute the confusion and dangers of the present time?" There can be little doubt that one main cause has been that for half a century we have thought less and less of the Day of Judgment. Yet early in that time Dr. Gore used to say that every Christian ought to reflect for a minute or two daily on the Great Day. Certain it is that, of all ways of treating the dread subject, to banish it from the mind is the worst. With our lips we honour Christ as the greatest of all teachers; but His message we mutilate beyond recognition to suit our British self-complacency, and then congratulate ourselves on our missionary zeal.

A great corporate sin affects our relation to God to a degree we cannot measure or express. Compared with that the effect on our social life is really no great matter, save that it is a salutary and very terrifying warning. For the discarding of the element of severity from the Gospel has undermined man's sense of responsibility; and when that happens, there is no form of devastation of character and conduct which may not ensue.

There are signs that the reticence of the Church of England on the subject of the Last Things, maintained during a half-century when almost every other topic is dragged into debate, is giving way. The menace of the present time reminds us of the sternness of the Gospel; and many have been pleading with Keble: "Save, Lord, by Love or Fear."

But at once a great difficulty arises. The same great Anglican teacher in his last published work,† writing on the orthodox doctrine of the destiny of impenitent sinners, says that it offends the conscience. What, then, are we to do?

The following article is an attempt to indicate how, with due regard to the sensitiveness of our generation, the austere teaching of the Tractarians may be revived, not only for the guidance of the multitude, but for their encouragement. For it is our conviction that the right temper in which to begin reflecting on the Last Things is to remember that the doctrine,

* The genesis of the article was the invitation of the Editor to comment upon comments received on the chapter on "Eternal Judgment" in my book *Whither?* Finding that my statement there was not clearly worded, I gratefully take the opportunity of recasting most of it. But the last four pages are referred to as they stand. Apology is offered for necessary compression of matter and scantiness of quotation.

Books chiefly consulted: Dean Church's *University Sermons*; Swete's *The Life after Death*; Pusey's *What is of Faith as to Eternal Punishment*; Dr. J. O. F. Murray's *Hulsean Lectures*; R. M. Benson's *Letters*; Dr. J. H. Leckie's *The World to Come and Final Destiny*; Langton-Clarke, *The Eternal Saviour Judge*.

† *Thoughts on the Itany*, p. 25.

in spite of its awfulness, has been given to us by the Prince of Love Himself, not to scare but to save. So if we approach the subject from the same angle as the Saints and Doctors of the Church, in particular our own Tractarians, we may come to share their power of submissively receiving the Word of God and yet to be moved to bless and praise His glorious Name.

We proceed, then, to state the doctrine called Orthodox: then to consider certain modifications which have been proposed.

THE DOGMA

The doctrine handed down by the Church is expressed positively in the *Quicumque Vult*, that hardened and impenitent sinners are destined to everlasting perdition. Further, that the final, eternal separation of the "lost" from the saved takes place *at death* is definitely implied in Scripture.*

From Origen's time, and probably before,† every clause in such a statement has been questioned. Who are meant by "hardened sinners"? Does perdition mean annihilation? And if final separation takes place at death, is there any hope of repentance after?

Before considering the palliations of the dogma which some have thought permissible, we must steady our minds by the reflection that if God has not taught it to us we men must have invented it. The latter hypothesis would imply that there is something in the human consciousness to which the terrific teaching is not entirely uncongenial. And this notion is confirmed by the fact that outside the Christian Society the leaders of heathen speculation have forecasted a future almost as bewildering as any picture drawn by Christians in the later Middle Ages. For the horrors of the doctrine as we have stated it have been magnified by Calvin and others far beyond any warrant of Scripture or tradition. For the blasphemous logical inference has been drawn that God predestines souls before birth to this unspeakable and unavoidable doom. Such a doctrine only needs to be mentioned, not as deserving of attention, but as indicating a certain affinity between human consciousness and theories of terror. What if that consciousness has been divinely implanted?

One more consideration must never be forgotten. The deep perplexity and dismay into which we are all apt to be plunged are the outcome of an unassailable conviction that God who made us loves us. If we had no such conviction we might lose all hope; but there would be no awful contradiction in our estimate of His treatment of us now and in Eternity.

* So Langton-Clarke, *The Eternal Saviour Judge*.

† Leckie, p. 255.

POSSIBLE MITIGATIONS

Universalism is the theory that after a necessary period—no matter how long—the most obdurate souls will be brought to repentance, and ultimately to the bliss of the Saints in Light. The wonder is that, though very often advocated, the doctrine has never been accepted by the Church: for its attractiveness is obvious. We have only space baldly to state the most serious objections. (1) The holy assurance with which the Saviour spoke of the things of the next world (*τὰ ἐπουράνια*) gives us no warrant for assuming that, if universal restoration is a fact, He would have used terrifying words implying the opposite. (2) The theory is a simplification of a tremendous mystery of Revelation. But to simplify such a mystery so as to make it comprehensible to a finite mind is an impiety. (3) The theory ignores what we know of free will, and the fixity of character which results from wrong choice (of the Ego before Christ). God *never* coerces our wills in this life. There is no hint given that He will do so hereafter. (4) Men with minds most undeniably imbued with the Holy Spirit, especially St. John and St. Paul, do not deny the orthodox doctrine, but transcend it.

CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY

This is the theory that all souls which persist in rejecting God's Love in this world and in the next will be annihilated. In addition to the objections stated above, the doctrine postulates an unknown amount of failure in the Divine purpose of Creation.

Other arguments have been urged against this doctrine.* But though rationally unanswerable, they somehow fail to convince; and it is noticeable that in questions of this sort, if it should chance that one disputant silences another, silence does not imply consent or even assent. For next day each mind is found to be quite unmoved. Yet minds do change; else the opening sentence of the Lord's earthly ministry would be wholly abortive. How this may be we now proceed to enquire.

AGNOSTICISM

When Christ echoed the words previously used by the Baptist, He paid a great tribute to His forerunner. The well-known sentence (Matt. iv. 17) may be paraphrased: "Change

* Two especially, well stated by Leckie: that we have no warrant for assuming that the soul is indestructible; secondly, that the theory implicitly denies the organic unity of the human race. Those who are gifted with immortality must be a separate species from those who are not (pp. 243-250).

your minds (now and onwards): for the Sovereign God is near to you." That is to say, "Recognize what I tell you, that the God whom ye worship is close to each one of you. Hence whatever command I give you is from Him, and contains the promise of supernatural help for the fulfilment. Especially true is this of My opening words: 'Change your whole view of life and duty and destiny, remembering that without God ye can do nothing. In every difficult question bring as humbly as you can the Eternal God into it.' " How do these injunctions bear upon our subject?

They imply clearly that any natural effortless state of opinion on the question of the destiny of impenitent sinners is sure to be wrong: for to think and feel rightly about it is beyond human power. Therefore the first thing required of us is an attitude of submissive receptivity, which takes God at His word. What, then, is His word?

It is on any interpretation tremendously stern, far sterner than any rational human being would expect. But reverence requires us to acknowledge that attempts to pare down the message to what we may call a natural standard of justice fail. Hence we are brought to see that for reasons we can only dimly guess at God has told us very little. That there will be a separation is clear: but the teaching is less positive and far less clear as to the lot of either group. It has long been recognized, indeed, that all attempts to depict or even imagine the life of Heaven are impossible. Our inability as to this perplexes nobody. But when we learn or think we are bound to infer from the New Testament that the condition of the "lost" is one of never-ending pain and regret: the pain of the knowledge of what is meant by exclusion from the Beatific Vision. The question is asked, May we not take refuge in agnosticism?

Before we answer the question let us take note of a special and subtle danger attaching to the word. Canon Quick has pointed out that no one can be an agnostic in action. There is strong reason to believe it is also impossible to be an agnostic in thought—certainly in any important subject. Supposing a man shrinks from thinking on the terrors of Hell and knows that many people are inclined to a Universalistic optimism, is he not strongly constrained to banish as far as he can the whole subject from his mind? But to do that is to assume that what was said by Christ and has been handed down by the Church is unimportant: and if it is unimportant it is not true. Therefore it may be disregarded. The real agnostic, if there is such a thing, is one who asserts that after due deliberation he cannot decide between the different pictures that have been drawn of the state of the wicked in Hell. But in the large majority of cases he only

acquiesces in this professed indecision because he has given no thought to the matter at all. He has heard enough of the subject to be frightened at it, and the easiest way to be quit of the fear is to think of something else. It is perfectly true that he does not know which of the different views is the true one: but that is because he has not tried to decide: and he has not tried to decide because he did not want to. Such an attitude, it is to be feared, betrays in countless cases a violation of the man's deepest conviction: that Christ's teaching is sublime, and that what He revealed to mankind of God's ways He revealed in love.

THE TRUE AGNOSTICISM

Yet it is certain that there is a true agnosticism which has been professed by a very large number of our most eminent thinkers and writers. It has been expressed by Dean Church in his University Sermon entitled *Sin and Judgment*. Dr. Gore wrote of this discourse in terms of high approval just before his death.* In no subject are Church's distinctive qualities so valuable: breadth of view, grasp of principle, sanity and self-restraint expressed in a style of stately beauty pervaded by a sense of awe which is strangely lacking in modern theological treatises.† In the same volume is a supremely fine discourse on *Responsibility for our Belief*. By it we are prepared for the caution combined with strong grasp of fundamentals with which the preacher warns us against temerity in judging of propositions beyond our ken and haziness of conception in regard to those where we ought to be definite and clear. Of the latter class is the severity with which the Saviour spoke. It is more appalling than we can rationally reconcile with the Divine Love. Again, what is within our finite minds to comprehend is the teaching that the time of probation ends with this our earthly life. But as to the future, "we pass into a stage of existence of which all the conditions are absolutely beyond our comprehension."

That is what we mean by true agnosticism. It is appropriate to the hints given us of the *state* of the departed, with the exception that we may not be doubtful in our acceptance of the doctrine that an eternal separation begins at death.

At this point some of our readers will conclude that we are merely restating the Gehenna doctrine. It is not so. The Gehenna doctrine goes further than Scripture in harsh definiteness—that is, by affirming that all lost souls will enter upon a state of unending woe, *without hope of amendment or mitigation, or of benefit*—and as soon as we are confronted with it we ask two

* *Thoughts on the Litany*, p. 27.

† A few years ago two volumes of extracts from our best prose writers were independently published. Not a word from Dean Church was in either.

things of our spiritual guides, living and dead: Do they affirm all this? And secondly, if not, where do they draw the line, and why? In answer we may say that all teachers whose minds are most in accord with the New Testament hesitate to affirm the propositions italicized here, but refuse to deny them. Along with these propositions there are a few optimistic hints in the teaching of our Lord and St. Paul which must certainly not be disregarded.* (We note in passing the significant fact that the terrific sayings, "the worm and the fire," "depart from Me," etc., are far more familiar to "ordinary" people than the more hopeful ones.)

Broadly, then, we notice that what may be called the orthodox teaching of the Church is strongly to emphasize the terror of Christ's message, but no less strongly the power of the Divine Love. So far we are dealing with what may be called certainties. The terror of the message lies mainly in the repeated affirmations that probation ends at the time of death. But it is clear that as soon as the teaching passes beyond the lifetime on earth and the probationary period it becomes indefinite and more metaphorical, less reducible to a system. Dean Church—and this is important—speaks in this tone of the optimistic sayings, but not of the terrifying ones. From this we infer that the weightiest of our authorities cling close to Scripture in affirming with solemn and awe-struck reverence (1) that the eternal destiny is fixed now: further (2) that though the dim picture of the destiny of the impenitent is "unspeakably awful," we may not doubt that God will deal with each soul, however hardened and defiant and self-enslaved, always and for ever in love. These are the only affirmations we can positively make as to the next life: all speculation aiming at reconciling them with the tremendous warnings uttered by the Prince of Love breaks down, as it measures the mysteries of Infinity by tests suitable only to the finite and to the things of earth. Logic applied to revealed truth in attempting to analyze revelation has led in one direction to the unwarranted doctrine called Universalism; in the other to the dark blasphemies of Calvinism.†

SUMMARY, SO FAR

We have reached the point where we can see that Scripture teaching and our own conviction of the infinite Divine Love present us with a great contradiction. This is the case wher-

* Church enumerates the following: Acts iii. 21; Rom. viii. 19; Eph. i. 10; 1 Cor. xv. 25; Phil. ii. 10; Luke ii. 47; 1 John v. 16; Matt. xii. 32.

† That is the doctrine that souls are predestined before birth to eternal and hopeless torment, called by R. M. Benson "blasphemous and unscriptural."

ever a revelation is made of the Divine to the human mind, and the Church bids us hold in equal poise the two sides of the contradiction without fretting at our inability to reconcile them. If we allow ourselves to fret we inevitably fall into grievous error by over-pressing one side and ignoring the other in the attempt to simplify a mystery. By the inspired author of the Book of Job a wholly insoluble problem was seen to be intelligible, not to reason, but to faith, when viewed in the light of the Creator's *Power*. But Christians have been given an infinitely richer background. There is literally no dogma of Revelation which may not be received by us in unassailable certitude and peace if we are enabled to set it in the framework of the holiness of our Heavenly Father.*

There remains, however, a question which must not be evaded. Granted that the separation at death is final, are we forbidden to forecast the condition of the "lost" in eternity; that is to say, to speculate on the meaning of the everlasting exclusion from the Presence of God?

If we do—that is, if we shape our speculation into a dogma however acceptable to the present generation—we offend against the principle laid down above that infinite mysteries are not to be gauged or explored by tests which are only legitimate in matters finite. It is a blessed fact that very many saints, beginning with St. Paul and St. John, have not felt the need of advancing beyond the point indicated. Nor have they either intensified or softened down the affirmations of the Son of God. If we of the twentieth century were saints, should we feel the need any more than they?

We can now discriminate between the true and the sham agnosticism. The sham kind is simply mental and spiritual indolence, and sometimes spiritual cowardice. Hearing that there are many questions raised which we cannot at present answer, a Christian may persuade himself into the line of least resistance, which is to do what he believes to be his duty in this present world and not to think of Eternity. It is to be noticed that such an agnostic is a sham, because, while professing not to know if Christ's teaching about Hell is worth attending to or not, he acts as if it were not. That is both indolence and cowardice.† It is also a heresy; and, like all other heresies, it undermines our sense of responsibility. How different the true agnosticism! It is the temper which prompted the ancient maxim, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*. For after candid self-examination and genuine desire for the wisdom which is from above, the Christian

* I owe this thought to Lady Gwendoline Cecil.

† Compare the scene in the Temple (Mark xi. 30).

seeker recognizes that we all are called to live in this world without being given the faculty for reconciling the awful pronouncements of the Divine severity with what we are told of the Divine Love. In recognizing this he is able to go further and turn the negative into a positive: that is, by thanking God for the disability under which he labours. For he knows that it is for our good, for the strengthening of our faith, that that faculty is for a time withheld. It is clear that such discernment is spiritual, not intellectual: not natural, but a supernatural gift. It is growth in knowledge of God's Love which gives promise, not of seeing which of the two points of view is right, but of transcending them both.

But that transcendence cannot be called agnosticism. When we read the Fourth Gospel, St. John's First Epistle, and the Apocalypse we find ourselves listening to a voice which, so far from speaking of ignorance, hints at things inexpressible in any human language. St. T  r  se of Lisieux and countless other holy ones give such rapturous expression to what they learn of the Mystical Union with Christ that the dark side of the picture seems to be flooded for them with an effulgence of heavenly radiance.

Does not that account for the most arresting fact that not only in the Psalms, but in many Christian writings, the awful judgments of the Creator on the ungodly and the proud are always spoken or sung of as a theme of praise?*

THE CHURCH'S MESSAGE

If the above statement of Church doctrine is fairly accurate, Langton-Clarke's dictum should be taught in close combination with the doctrine of the eternal separation of the saved from the lost at the end of the earthly probation time. The dictum is that "judgment" in Scripture means most frequently "deliverance": less frequently "the pronouncement of a sentence": least frequently "the execution of a sentence." We note also that the Greek word for judgment ("crisis") means "a separating." Again, provided that the same stern doctrine is given its due place, we may set against it J. B. Mozley's pithy conclusion: "All will be well, but we know not how."

APPENDIX

Of possible mitigations of the doctrine there is only one which is free from nearly all the objections mentioned. The dogma of

* This fact, which I cannot but think very important, is illustrated in *Whither?* (chapter on "Eternal Judgment," *sub fin.*).

separation at death is appalling in proportion as we attach to it the prospect of penalty without limit and *without possibility of amendment*. So the suggestion is that hardened souls may after all have the opportunity of something like *μετάνοια*, though without hope of restoration to the bliss of the fully redeemed. That is to say, on a lower plane of existence, on the other side of the gulf, they may ultimately be brought by the chastisement inflicted by never-failing Love to a complete resignation of the Divine Will. But the extent of the loss no reverent mind would dare to imagine.

I have not included this theory in the text, as it has apparently been only with some hesitation advocated by writers of note; and for the greatest interpreters of Revelation it has not been needed. One high authority writes insisting that the indications of fixity of character on this side of death are too plain to be ignored, and that prayers offered for a soul in which the love of God has been completely destroyed can do no good; yet affirms that if a spark of such love survives till death the soul is curable. In other words the suggestion is—like that of Pusey—that the harshness of the Gehenna doctrine may be toned down by the hope that the number of the “lost” will be small. A Roman Catholic friend says he sometimes thinks the only soul in Hell will be Judas Iscariot. The objection to such palliation of the doctrine is that there are hints in the Gospel which seem to contradict it, such as in the Parable of the Sower. Also the thought of one such soul stagnating in hopeless rebellion suggests an eternal disharmony in the Universe. In favour of the “Lower Plane” theory it may be said it emphasizes the point where the Bible teaching is most definite: the eternity of *κρίσις*. The fixity of character as the warrant for the separation is also assumed (it is virtually denied by Universalism), but not to the extent of postulating an everlasting hopeless antagonism to the Divine Will.

Hence, I submit that for those enquirers who cannot yet rise to the transcending of the contradiction as indicated in the text, the “Lower Plane” theory may profitably be suggested as a stepping-stone for their faith: what Plato called a raft, legitimate as a hope; and yet as retaining the awfulness insisted on by the Tractarians.

E. LYTTTELTON.

VON HÜGEL'S THREE LAWS OF THE GROWTH OF RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY

THE Appendix to Part 2 of *The Mystical Element of Religion* consists of a "Chronological Account and Critical Analysis of the Materials for the Reconstruction of Saint Catharine's Life and Teaching." It is introduced by a short section (vol. i., pp. 371-375) which deals with "the general forms and laws which regulate the growth of all religious devotional biography." Von Hügel calls them "laws," but they might equally well, or perhaps better, be described as stages of transmission. He has packed so much thought into these few pages that the language is often obscure, and this paper is an attempt to elucidate his meaning and to draw out certain of its implications.

I

1. The first is what he calls the law of *contemporary, simultaneous, spontaneous variation of apprehension*. This is the earliest stage, in which we are dealing with the accounts given by eye-witnesses, or at all events by contemporaries. Such accounts are "spontaneous" because they represent direct reactions to a direct influence, the natural response of a natural instinct to record important events of which the recorder has first-hand knowledge. If you take the accounts given of the same events or recollections of the same sayings by two or more of such contemporary witnesses and compare them, you will find—even supposing that you assume that the witnesses are equally self-oblivious, truthful and sincere—quite clear and recognizable variations. The same facts impress different persons in different ways, and the details stored in the memory of one person may, and probably will, differ from those stored in the memory of another. This comes about because an historical occurrence is not a simple, clear-cut fact like the facts with which science deals, in which it is a matter of a downright "Yes" or "No" to a definite question, but a very complicated matter, crowded with details which are apprehended, some clearly and consciously, some dimly and subconsciously, while some are not apprehended at all. The mind and the memory of each beholder or listener makes a selection from what he sees or hears according to the impression produced upon him; and inasmuch as what he sees will seldom, if ever, be exactly the same as what his neighbour sees, and the impression received will take the colour of his own temperament and mood, his report, however faithful in the main to the central fact, will be

tinged with a subjective element which cannot be ignored in any attempted reconstruction of what occurred.

We must go further, and acknowledge the fact of which all lawyers and magistrates are so well aware, that perfectly honest witnesses often give varying or even conflicting evidence, as the result either of deficient powers of exact observation or of some treacherous action of the memory.

We do not on these accounts fall into a sceptical distrust of the value of human testimony, or despair of reaching reasonable certainty; but, if we are wise, we draw two conclusions:

(a) That the process of arriving at historical fact is likely to make great demands upon our patience, industry and powers of judgment. There will have to be much appraising and balancing of the evidence.

(b) That the existence of differences of outlook and variations, and perhaps even contradictions, in the evidence, which seem at first sight to constitute formidable difficulties in the way of the attainment of a consistent conception of the life-history and the significance of a great spiritual Personality, may be found in the end to indicate that the road to a more perfect knowledge lies not in the direction of levelling down or paring away supposed inconsistencies, but in the enlargement of the conception already formed. It may be that there is a higher, wider unity under which the differences may be subsumed, and in the light of which the inconsistencies may be reconciled, if we can get a glimpse of it. At all events, the amazing expansion of many departments of knowledge in recent years ought to make us very wary of supposing that we have already got all the evidence we are likely to get as to the historical facts in any particular case; and the not less remarkable broadening of mental outlook can hardly have failed to predispose us to expect and to welcome enlarged estimates of the content of spiritual truth.

2. The second law von Hügel calls the law of *posterior, successive, reflective variation of elaboration*. We have now passed into another stage. First-hand impressions are no longer to be had, but the need of a true record is not less, but greater than before. It cannot be long before the existence of the "variations of apprehension" is realized, and the necessity of a scrutiny of the evidence becomes apparent. But the subjective element is still at work. Those who are beyond the direct influence of the great Personality himself, even if they are no further removed than "spiritual grandchildren," when they come to form their own picture of his life and teaching, will tend to see them differently from the first generation of disciples. They will absorb and restate, according to their

own powers and temperaments, rather than reproduce exactly the impressions of those who were in immediate contact.

These "variations of elaboration" are not likely to be less numerous than the original "variations of apprehension." The probability is that they will be more numerous and more divergent, because they are not primary, but secondary impressions. In Platonic language, they are one degree further removed from reality. It does not follow that they are necessarily further removed from the truth. The result of the process of reflection which has been at work may have been not merely to bring into clearer light the differences in the original records of the facts and the original impressions produced, but to enhance the realization of their significance. The balance, on the whole, may come down on the side of gain, not loss. Thus, to take one of von Hügel's own instances, the Pauline and Johannine writings in the New Testament represent the emergence into distinctness, even in those early days, of two different "apprehensions and interpretations of our Lord's inexhaustible life, character, teaching, and work," which are only dimly suggested in the earliest stratum of the record in the Synoptic Gospels, but which, when their significance is fully realized, enrich and enlarge beyond measure the original conception of the meaning of Christianity.

3. Later on there comes a third stage, governed by what von Hügel rather enigmatically calls the law of *conservation, juxtaposition and identification*. This is the era of the "redactor," or editor. His duty is to decide what elements of the evidence are worthy of "conservation" and to see that they are preserved; to bring together by "juxtaposition" the various elements in such a way that their mutual relations are made clear; and by a process of "identification" to eliminate what is erroneous and establish what is true. The evidence as to historical facts derived from the first stage has to be tested and weighed, and the value of the different interpretations which emerge in the second stage has to be assessed. This process is always going on; for even when a reasonable amount of certainty as to the main facts and the general significance has been reached, there is always the possibility of the discovery of new facts, and the editor himself is an interpreter and may himself reach a new and enlarged point of view.

In this third stage two opposite tendencies are to be noted:

(a) The conscious concentration of attention upon the records of the past, the careful weighing and comparison of evidence—the intensive application of the critical-historical method, in short—tends, until the results become firmly established, to give rise to a sense of vagueness and confusion. The

sharpness of the original outline becomes blurred with the lapse of time, and the figure is buried under an ever-increasing accumulation of commentary and interpretation which obscures its form and features. Much of this is mere rubbish, and only serves to thicken the air and dim the light. The editor's task is to clear away the rubbish: but he works in a maze, sometimes so light as to interfere but little with his operations, but sometimes so thick as to constitute a dense fog. In the latter case it is not surprising if the specialist, who alone is in a position to give full weight to the difficulties which lie in his path, often tends to a more or less pronounced scepticism as to the possibility of a satisfactory reconstruction.

(b) But an editor may react in the opposite direction. His own conviction of the importance and significance of the Personality in question as manifested by his influence in history, and his sense of the spiritual loss to mankind which would ensue if the figure became involved in hopeless confusion, may be so profound that he determines to cling at all costs to an accepted traditional estimate which must at the least have some considerable body of evidence to support it, and which the lapse of time and the adherence of thousands of disciples have rendered venerable. If he does so, he may be in danger of mistaking a particular and temporal form of apprehension, which is necessarily limited, for the whole content of an essence which is inexhaustible and eternal. He may slam the door which in the interest of truth it is vital to keep open. The instinct which makes him desire unity, clarity and certainty is natural and profound. It lies at the root of all knowledge. But, as von Hügel often insists, there are different kinds of knowledge, which admit of different degrees of clearness and certainty, and it is irrational to expect greater clearness and completeness than the nature of the subject-matter under consideration allows. There is the kind of knowledge which is derived from science, which deals with abstract ideas and numerical and spatial relations. This is clear and complete as far as it goes, because it is all within the mind and isolated from direct contact with the real. It does not involve the assertion that there are particular, concrete existents corresponding to the ideas. Mathematics, for instance, does not affirm that the ideal triangle or circle with which it deals exists anywhere in concrete form. But the case is different when you come to deal with "affirmations of real existences and of real qualities attached to such existences" (*Essays and Addresses*, i. 101). Here the mind is no longer concerned with limited, definite conceptions cut out of the welter of experience and isolated so that they may become clearly apprehensible and manageable.

It is in direct contact with reality itself, and reality is inexhaustible. Knowledge loses its simplicity and transparency, and starts on a voyage of discovery. And the higher the grade of reality with which any given kind of knowledge deals, the more complicated and difficult does its attainment become.

Now a deep spiritual Personality is a reality of a specially rich and intricate kind. It is unlikely, therefore, that its significance will be exhausted in any particular formulation at any particular time. "All the supreme realities and truths," he says in a letter to Tyrrell (*Letters*, p. 71), "are incomprehensible." That is to say, that they are not susceptible of statement in terms of knowledge of the scientific sort. But he adds at once that, if not completely comprehensible, they are "indefinitely apprehensible." The door is always open, and the test of the value of knowledge of reality already attained is that it should lead on to the attainment of further knowledge. It must be "rich and fruitful" (*Essays*, i. 105).

II

If this analysis of the history of the transmission of the influence of a great Personality is accepted, von Hügel says that three attitudes are possible:

1. There is what he calls the *impoverishing, sectarian, "purity" attitude*. This is in reality based upon a certain assumption, which may, however, be partly unconscious. The assumption is that it is possible to reach an apprehension of such a Personality which is "pure" because it is uncoloured by any subjective characteristics of the apprehending mind and spirit. The figure is conceived as standing out definite and circumscribed, something purely external, to be taken or left as it is. It does not change in itself, or in its effects upon, or in the manner of its apprehension by other souls. Its manifestation in history at a definite point of time is taken to exhaust its significance, and the safest and surest method of appreciation of its worth is to rely upon the earliest records both of the facts and of the impressions produced. They, it is assumed, are likely to give, if not an absolutely objective picture, at all events the nearest possible approach to it. Subsequent elaborations confuse the simplicity and dull the sharpness of the original outlines. The idea that reflection and the expansion of spiritual experience may lead to a progressive unfolding of the meaning of the life and teaching is excluded, because it is held that there is nothing else to unfold.

Such an attitude is "impoverishing" because it closes the door against the incorporation of anything that is new. It is

"sectarian" because it takes the part for the whole, ignoring the fact that no finite formulation of the infinite can possibly be complete.

2. Then there is the *destructive, sceptical, identity attitude*. It is obvious enough that a keen intellectual realization of the existence of variations and inconsistencies and difficulties of different kinds is quite likely to lead to a scepticism which may take a destructive turn. But why does he describe this as the "identity" attitude? The single sentence which is apparently intended to make this clear is very obscure.

"The second attitude would so understand the admitted identity of the Personality observed as practically to identify also the simultaneous and successive observers and observations, and to eliminate all variety and growth in that spirit's own inner life and in its apprehension by other minds."

I take this to mean that it is a mistake to suppose that a great Personality, admitted to be himself a real unity, must necessarily produce the same impression upon all observers or students, or to make no allowance for variety or growth in the Personality himself; and that anyone who starts with such an expectation will be liable, when he fails to find what he expects, either to despair of the attainment of any measure of certainty, or to take refuge in the manipulation of such of the evidence as conflicts with his preconceived ideas. The effect of the "variations" upon him is the opposite of the effect produced upon the representative of the first attitude. He overrates their importance: the other underrates it. He ends in unjustifiable doubt: the other ends in equally unjustifiable certainty.

It is to be noted that the fundamentalist and the sceptic, however different their conclusions may be, really start from the same point. They are both in search of a unity which may be regarded as whole, final and complete. The fundamentalist's heart is too strong for his head; and because he intensely desires such a unity, nothing will persuade him that he has not already got it. The sceptic's head is too strong for his heart; and, in spite of natural disappointment, he ends in declaring that he was a fool to suppose that he could ever get it. The error in both cases lies in the supposition that the nature of spiritual reality is such that it can be comprehended in a clear, definite formula such as is adequate and appropriate where no affirmation of real, particular, concrete existence is involved.

Nothing that has been said must be taken to imply that the facts of the life under investigation and the estimate of the value of the various interpretations are not amenable to treat-

ment upon purely scientific lines. The critical-historical method is a scientific method. It selects and isolates facts and deals with them in isolation, cutting them out of the moving flux of the real and arresting them after the manner of an instantaneous photograph. This is the only way in which the mind can deal with them if it is to form clear conceptions, and clear conceptions of the details are as indispensable in biography as in any other science. The point to be emphasized is that any number of clear intellectual conceptions does not exhaust the significance of a deep spiritual life. Knowledge upon the scientific level is not enough.

3. The third attitude von Hügel describes as "the fruitful, truly Catholic *approximation and development* attitude." It is fruitful, because it gathers in hitherto ungarnered harvests of truth. It is "Catholic," I suppose, in the widest and broadest sense of the word, because it adopts the policy of the open door, instead of staking all upon the defence of an interpretation already attained and regarded as final and complete. It represents the opposite of the impoverishing sectarianism of the first attitude. It recognizes that the results achieved are only "approximate," and looks forward to a "development" which will carry knowledge on indefinitely, growing ever nearer to, if never attaining, finality.

This, of course, was von Hügel's own attitude, and it completely reverses the popular estimate of the relation of sectarianism to catholicity. Historically, what gave rise to the sects was the necessity (real or supposed) of a protest against external tyranny, against an artificial and unjustifiable limitation of spiritual aspirations. They were revolts in the name of freedom, and the "liberty of prophesying" in some form or other was their watchword. This is what gave them their power. But the result has been not the emancipation of which they were in search, but the imposition of straiter limits than before. The road to true freedom and true comprehensiveness lies, according to von Hügel, in the frank recognition of the constant presence of a subjective element in "apprehension" on the one hand, and an "indefinite richness and many-sided apprehensibleness" in every great Personality on the other. And he maintained that this is what Catholicism really stands for, or ought to stand for. It is the "approximation and development attitude" which is "truly Catholic."

L. V. LESTER-GARLAND.

THE REIGN OF SAUL

It seems at first sight to be almost impossible to compile anything like a connected or satisfactory account of the reign of Saul. The events by which he came to the throne are and will remain a mystery.* Neither of the two accounts preserved by popular tradition, complete as they seem to be, is consistent with the other or with itself. Thus, in what appears to be the older tradition (1 Sam. ix. 1—x. 27a) Saul is presented to the reader as a son working on his father's farm and not trusted to go on a simple mission without being accompanied by a servant, who displays much more knowledge and initiative than Saul, who apparently has never heard of Samuel. This is not the sort of man whom Samuel or anyone else would at first sight choose for a king. Then, about a month after (ὥς μετὰ μῆνα, 1 Sam. xi. 1, LXX) this somewhat sheepish youth appears as a vigorous and successful warrior with a grown-up and martial son (1 Sam. xiii. 1). Both these representations cannot be correct, and this idyllic legend breaks down of itself. It will be further observed that this narrative is based on the assumption that the appointment, not only of a king, but of Saul, was the declared will of Jahweh (1 Sam. ix. 15, 19). It is also curious that a transaction of such vital importance was kept entirely secret. Saul appears to have told nobody what had happened (1 Sam. x. 14-16) and to have returned to the daily life of the farm (1 Sam. xi. 5).

The other (and later) story (1 Sam. viii.—x. 17-27) is entirely different. The desire for a king comes from the people, and is disapproved not only by Samuel but by Jahweh. As a later writer expressed the thought: "I gave thee a king in Mine anger" (Hos. xiii. 10). It is impossible to regard as historical the scene where the whole people in their tribes and their clans are assembled at Mizpeh in full view of their Philistine oppressors, and elect a king by lot. It does not appear that this was the sacred lot, as in 1 Sam. xiv. 36, as there is no mention of the High Priest. The sacred oracle by lot with the Urim and Thummim and the Ephod (whatever it was) ceremonially worn or used in the ritual of the lot seems to have been exclusively practised and used by the High Priest.† But we cannot think that any people would entrust its leadership in war to any man thrown up by the chances of an ordinary ballot. It is curious that the Saul described here has a certain

* Kittel, *Gesch.*, II. ii. 135.

† Cannon, "Levi, the Curse and the Blessing," *Holborn Review*, April, 1927, p. 184, where the instances are given.

resemblance to the Saul of the other legend. He hides himself among the baggage. There is nothing kingly about him, and the narrator shows a consciousness of this when he alludes to the men who said, "Who is this fellow who is to deliver us?" and despised him (1 Sam. x. 27). The whole of this story is schematic and late. It bears the impress of its origin in a period which had known unsatisfactory kings and protesting prophets.*

May it be possible, out of these conflicting traditions, to extract some fragments of truth? Saul did become king, and this fact seems to imply that he must have been in some way a known character, not merely an undistinguished farmer's son. Israel was at this period constantly oppressed and even disarmed (1 Sam. xiii. 18) by the Philistines. The success described in 1 Sam. vii., if it is historical at all, was only temporary. Further, a serious attack by Ammon was in prospect (1 Sam. xii. 12). The king the occasion required was an experienced warrior, and this justifies us in assuming that Saul had at some time or other come to the front in previous conflicts in the never-ending Philistine war. Israel in this period had no army. A burgher militia was called out when necessary, and leaders like Barak, Gideon, and Jephtha took command through natural fitness to do so. Perhaps Saul had come to the front in this way. This view obtains support from the account of the Ammonite expedition (1 Sam. xi.), where the rapid and successful tactician is a very different figure from the bashful youth who hid himself among the baggage; perhaps, also, by the fact that Saul and his son were the only Israelites possessed of proper weapons (1 Sam. xiii. 22). It has been recently suggested† that the attack on the Philistine *n'sib* (1 Sam. xiii. 3) was Saul's first achievement, but this is contrary to the tradition which makes the danger threatening from Ammon the proximate cause of the demand for a king (1 Sam. xii. 12).

It also clearly appears from the traditions that the character and conduct of Saul had been deeply influenced by his intercourse with the *Nabiim*. We have the best evidence of this fact in a popular saying, or *mashal*, which appears twice in the narratives with different surroundings (1 Sam. x. 12, xix. 24): "Is Saul also [enrolled] among the *Nabiim*?" At this period of national stress and peril there seems to have been a reappearance‡ of these companies of ecstatic dervishes once heard of in the time of Moses (Num. xi. 22-29), but not afterwards mentioned till this time. They seem to have been

* See H. P. Smith, *I.C.C. Samuel*, p. xx.

† Lods, *Israel*, 408.

‡ Budde, *Com. Samuel*, 68.

organized in companies under the general direction of Samuel and to have had a house or college* at Naioth near Ramah (1 Sam. xix. 18, 19). We cannot tell what was the topic of their excited utterances, but we can hardly doubt that it was religious and patriotic. We may form an idea of the violence of their performances by the fact† that "prophet" and "madman" were at a much later date employed as synonymous.

Saul undoubtedly had a deeply religious nature. He sacrificed before going into battle (1 Sam. xiii. 12). The High Priest and the Ephod were with him in the field (1 Sam. xiv. 3, 18, LXX). He was willing to put his son to death for violating a *tabu* (1 Sam. xiv. 39), and was horrified when the people ate the captive prey with the blood (1 Sam. xiv. 31). His slaughter of the Gibeonites (2 Sam. xxi. 2) had probably a religious as well as a patriotic motive, and his expulsion of persons practising methods of resorting to demons (1 Sam. xxviii. 3) certainly had a religious basis. We are told of the *first* altar he built (1 Sam. xiv. 35) which implies that he built others, probably pointing to some special cult.

Upon a nature such as this the wild shouts and dances of the ecstatic prophets had an extraordinary influence. He was turned into another man (1 Sam. x. 6) and joined in the orgies till he was utterly exhausted (1 Sam. xix. 23). It is said on several occasions that the spirit of Jahweh rushed‡ upon him (1 Sam. x. 6, 9, xi. 16, xviii. 10), and in the two latter instances when no other Nabiim were present. He must be regarded as belonging to their number, and it can scarcely be doubted that his elevation to the position of king was warmly supported by these enthusiasts as by their leader Samuel.

The position of Samuel is not easy to understand. The older tradition introduces him as a man of God, a Seer, *Ro'eh*, a sort of fortune-teller, and a later note explains that he was a *Nabi* (1 Sam. ix. 6; see iii. 19-21). He appears as such to have delivered oracles in Shiloh and to have had a widespread reputation. He does not seem to have been a priest,§ although at that period he might well have become so without the Levitical descent given to him in 1 Chron. vi. 8 (see Judg. xvii., xviii.) He was, in fact, an Ephraimite, and on the destruction of Shiloh (Jer. vii. 12; Ps. lxxviii. 60 f.) naturally returned to his home at Ramah (1 Sam. vii. 17, viii. 4, ix. 6, xv. 34, xvi. 13, xxv. 1, xxviii. 3). Here he continued to give Divine oracles, and must still have been a well-known character, though very curiously,

* *Ibid.*, 139.

† מְשֻׁנָּה וּמְחֻנָּה (Jer. xxix. 26; see 2 Kings ix. 11).

‡ צָלַח, as Samson (Judg. xiv. 19, xv. 14).

§ See Budde, *u.s.*, p. 20.

as before observed, Saul seems not to have heard of him. Here, too, it would appear that, like Elisha at a later time, he directed the activities of the Nabiim living at Naioth. As a giver of oracles and Superior of these prophets he would be a notable and respected personality in Ephraim and Benjamin, perhaps in even wider circles.

Much later and of very little value are the stories which regard Samuel as a "Judge" of all Israel (1 Sam. vii. 6, 15 *f.*). This statement is the result, not of contemporary tradition, but of post.-Deut. reflection in the manner of Judg. ii. 11-19. Samuel had a good deal of moral authority in his limited circle,* but anything like government by him was impossible in the presence of the Philistines. Equally unhistorical are the statements that the Philistines were in the time of Samuel beaten down and came no more into the boundary of Israel in all his days (1 Sam. vii. 13). As in the time of Samson (Judg. xiv. 4) the Philistines were rulers in Israel, and one of their outposts was actually in the town where Saul lived (1 Sam. x. 5, xiv. 2).

It can hardly be possible under such conditions that a great assembly to choose a king by ballot could have been held at a prominent place like Mizpeh (1 Sam. x. 17). On the other hand, it seems certain that before a choice was made there must have been many conferences between leading men in Israel and Samuel at Ramah† (1 Sam. viii. 14). It is by no means unlikely that the final decision was arrived at under cover of a sacrificial feast in the holy place at Ramah, where among the invited guests (*q'ruim*, 1 Sam. ix. 13, 22) we seem to discern delegates from other tribes. It is evident that Saul was Samuel's candidate and was accepted by the others. The whole affair was carried out secretly. No royal state or residence was provided. Saul went back to his farm to wait for what his hand should find to do (1 Sam. x. 7). But it is worthy of note that the messengers from Jabesh Gilead knew where to go in their need,‡ and his striking success in this campaign led to his general recognition as king (1 Sam. xi. 12).

It was a fact of great importance and not altogether to the advantage of the new monarchy that Samuel had been so instrumental in the choice of Saul. For both as a prophet of Jahweh and as head of the Nabiim Samuel seems to have claimed (if we can trust the tradition) an absolute right to direct the actions of the king and to reprove him in no measured terms. The reported saying, "Seven days thou must wait until I come to thee, and I will let thee know what thou hast to do" (1 Sam. x. 8), belongs indeed to the story which regards

* Kittel, *u.s.*, 134.

† Kittel, *u.s.*, 136.

‡ The LXX in xi. 4 reads *eis Γαβὰ πρὸς Σαουλ*.

Saul as an inexperienced youth, but it leads up to the first quarrel between the two men (1 Sam. xiii. 8 *f.*). Both this and the story of the second quarrel (chap. xv.) exhibits these men in an impossible relation which was bound to result, as it did result, in alienation and separation.

The story of the *first* rejection of Saul is impossible to understand. It implies in the first place that the breach with Samuel happened only a week after the appointment of Saul and at the opening of serious warfare with the Philistines, and it does not leave any time for the Ammonite campaign which had been approved by Samuel (1 Sam. xi. 7). The circumstances recorded are simply incredible. The strategic situation was most dangerous, the army were deserting in large numbers, the appointed time was past, and Samuel had not come.* Saul was bound to act without him (1 Sam. xiii. 12). As is observed by Caspari,† we cannot discern what the author means us to think Saul's fault was. He had as good a right to sacrifice as Samuel. Did he commit some ritual irregularity? At this critical moment, in face of the enemy, Samuel informs the new king that his kingdom shall not abide, but pass to another. No consequences followed this appalling announcement. Samuel went away and Saul mustered his army and moved from his perilous position to Gibeah (Chap. xiii. 15, LXX). It cannot be thought that this story has any historical value. It is a pale reflection of the detailed story in chap. xv. of an event which had really serious consequences. It is impossible to believe that Samuel could have struck such a blow at the new king just at the moment when he was to face for the first time the national enemy.

The *second* or real rejection, on the other hand, was a serious matter with very grave results. Here Saul knew himself to be in fault (1 Sam. xv. 24). He was, as observed above, a religious man, and he knew the full significance of the *cherem*, or sacred ban (ver. 3), which prevailed in its full savagery at this epoch‡ (Exod. xxii. 19, and, for examples, Num. xxi. 12, Judg. i. 17, the same event; Josh. vi. 17). When Saul yielded to the wishes of his troops (as other generals have had to do) it was with full consciousness that a sacred law was being violated. The real difficulty about this story is to understand why Samuel, on the doubtless sincere repentance of Saul, refused to be further associated with him. He did so far relax his severity as to worship with him, and the dread announcement of rejection was not made public. But the breach was final, and it is

* War Samuel bei Sinneu? (Wellhausen, *Comp.*, iii., p. 245).

† Caspari, *Samuel*, 138.

‡ See Ewald *Alterth*, *E.T.*, p. 77.

practically (if not literally, 1 Sam. xix. 23) true that the two men never met again. It is clear that we have not here the whole of the story. It must be assumed, and the tradition of the so-called first rejection supports the view,* that there had been many other disputes and quarrels between these men whose relation to each other was so difficult. This final breach was undoubtedly disastrous to Saul; it was probably the beginning of the outbreaks of furious madness (1 Sam. xvi. 14) which marked his career from this time onward, and for which his naturally scrupulous nature and the orgies of the Nabiim had prepared the ground.

From this point we have no consecutive history of Saul. The writers who have narrated his story regard him as *de jure* deposed and all their interest is now claimed by David. Almost all we hear of Saul now relates to his insane and furious jealousy of David and the crimes, such as the slaughter of the priests at Nob (1 Sam. xxi.), which sprang from it. As the story stands the whole of the life of Saul after his separation from Samuel seems to have been spent in hunting David, with occasional interludes of Philistine warfare (1 Sam. xxiii. 27). This part of the story, from chap. xvi. onwards, must have been written by Davidic writers. No doubt some such episodes did happen—they were certain to happen under such conditions—but they do not exhaust the history of Saul's reign. For in 1 Sam. xiv. 47 we have this important statement:

“And Saul took the kingdom over Israel, and fought all around against all his enemies, against Moab, and against the children of Ammon, and against Edom, and against Beth Rehob (LXX), and against the king of Soba, and against the Philistines, and wherever he turned he was victorious.† And he did valiantly and smote Amalek, and delivered Israel from the hand of his plunderer.”

This passage seems to have been taken from some old list or summary of Saul's reign,‡ in which the list of Saul's wars is followed by an enumeration of his family. Possibly it is inserted in the wrong place, and ought to come after and not before chap. xv. What is of interest, however, to our present enquiry is not so much the document which states these facts, but the question of their historic truth. Wellhausen§ contended that no such deeds were to be ascribed to Saul. David was the first to carry out wars with Moab, Ammon, Edom, and Soba.

* Kittel, *u.s.*, 143.

† M.T., יִרְשִׁיט; LXX, ἐσώζετο. Lat. *superabat* = שָׁרַב, as in Zech. ix. 9 (Driver, *Samuel*, 91).

‡ See Kittel, *u.s.*, 30; Smith, *u.s.*, 126; Caspari, *ad loc.*

§ *Comp.*, iii. 244.

Saul, apart from the relief of Jabesh and the conquest of Amalek, had to defend himself all his life against the Philistines, and perished in the struggle. Budde and Robinson take much the same view. In examining this opinion the following considerations should be borne in mind:

(a) The peoples named had been warring with Israel ever since the entry of the latter into Palestine. Such conflicts were under the circumstances inevitable and had prevailed throughout the period of the "Judges." There are recorded wars with Edom under Othniel* (Judg. iii. 8-11), with Moab under Ehud (Judg. iii. 12 f.) and Jephtha,† with Ammon under Ehud and Jephtha (Judg. xi.), with Amalek under Ehud, and with Philistines under Shamgar (Judg. iii. 31) and Samson. If we could accept the daring conjecture of Caspari,‡ who proposes to read in 1 Sam. xii. 9 "King Tushratta§ of Hazor" instead of "Sisera, chief of the army of Hazor," we should also have a war with Syria under Barak. But it does not seem possible to adopt so far-reaching an alteration of the text without either necessity or evidence. But leaving this aside, it would have been a most extraordinary circumstance if Saul had never had to fight with any of these inveterate foes of Israel, and if this had been stated it would have been difficult to believe.

(b) The victories over Ammon and Amalek are attested by quite different documents (chaps. xi., xv.), which shows that in our source we are dealing with facts and not fancies. It should not be forgotten that there were in Jerusalem in David's time members of Saul's family, Meribaal and Mika (2 Sam. ix.), who could give accurate information as to his exploits and personal history.|| Moab was constantly at war with Israel, and there is certainly confirmatory evidence of the tradition of Saul's warfare with them when we find that David, who seems to have had Moabite ancestry (Ruth iv. 22; 1 Chron. ii. 15), went when at the last extremity to the King of Moab to ask for an asylum for his father and mother, and left them there (1 Sam. xxii. 3). As regards Edom, we have suggested in another place¶ that "Saul of Rehoboth on the river" (Gen. xxxvi. 37) was our Saul, who had conquered that town in Gebalene in the north of Edom. There does not seem to be any evidence to confirm the statement that Saul made war with the little Syrian kingdoms of Beth Rehob and Soba. If we may venture

* Cannon, "Israel and Edom," THEOLOGY, September, 1927, pp. 135-136.

† Cannon, "Israel and Moab," THEOLOGY, May, 1930, pp. 251-253.

‡ Sam., 132.

§ As to Tushratta, see *Cam. Anc. Hist.*, II. 95 et seq.

|| Caspari, *u.s.*, 132.

¶ Cannon, "Israel and Edom," *u.s.*, 137. See North, "Hebrew Kingship," *Z.A.W.*, 1932, p. 33.

to borrow an analogy from David's time, the reason for such conflicts would be that Ammon had made an alliance with these Syrians in the face of a common danger (2 Sam. x. 6).

With these results may be compared the general view of Saul as a victorious warrior in the great *Kinah* certainly composed by David* and preserved in an absolutely independent source—the book of *Jasher* (2 Sam. i. 17-27). This poem, when all allowance is made for the fact that it is a eulogy of the dead and for poetic licence, could hardly have been written about unsuccessful or undistinguished warriors. Its refrain is, "How heroes (*gibborim*) fell." The sword of Saul used not to return empty. He and his son were swifter than eagles, stronger than lions. They adorned the daughters of Israel with costly raiment and jewels—the spoils of war. Such expressions could not have been used unless there had been a real background of substantial victories in the field.

(c) Some difficulty may be felt as to these statements on the ground that the Philistine conflict was going on all the time (ver. 52), and that the wars ascribed to Saul were often in distant and Transjordanic regions. Israel must be thought of in such cases as fighting on two fronts at once. But the Philistine war could not be always active. From their fortified outposts (1 Sam. x. 5, xiv. 1) the enemy would send out plundering or raiding parties (1 Sam. xiv. 7). Israel sometimes did the same (1 Sam. xviii. 16), and skirmishes would ensue, but apparently no decisive battle. Saul had at Gibeah some sort of a standing army (1 Sam. xiv. 52), and for apparently a considerable period David seems to have been in successful command on the Philistine front, to the satisfaction both of the people and the army (1 Sam. xviii. 5, 12-16). This view is illustrated by a typical scene. David, on returning from a victory over the Philistines, is met† by dancing women, who sing a little refrain:

Saul slew his thousands
And David his myriads.

This is not difficult to understand. Saul's successes across the Jordan, though substantial and useful, were not likely to arouse so much enthusiasm in the people of Benjamin as those of David over an enemy whom they could see, and who was a daily terror to them. This distich may reasonably be taken as evidence of the fact that Saul did achieve real successes somewhere, and after chap. xiv. no victory over the Philistines is attributed to him.

(d) In the earlier account of Saul's accession (1 Sam. x. 1)

* See Smith, *u.s.*, 258-259.

† Reading with LXX, εἰς συνάντησιν Δαυὶδ.

it is stated that his task would be to deliver the people of Jahweh from the hand of their enemies round about,* and in the introduction to the later account (1 Sam. viii. 20) the function of the king is defined to be to go out before us and to fight our wars. These passages revealed a knowledge that Israel at that period *had* enemies all round,† and that Saul would certainly have to fight them as the document (xiv. 47) records that he did. And it will not be forgotten that at all times he had at his disposal Abner, the experienced general (1 Sam. xxvi. 13), as David had Joab.

(e) This document or list shows no sign of being controversial or anti-Davidic. It appears to be meant to be a plain summary of facts without any sort of tendency. It seems, therefore, to be a sound tradition that at some period of his reign Saul did wage wars and achieve successes in defence of the Northern and Transjordanic tribes, which were after his death firm supporters of his son.‡

We have no other records of "a reign of which later Judean prejudice has preserved but little that is trustworthy"§ until the final tragedy of Saul's growing maniacy, defeat and death. There is no chronology to help us, the note 1 Sam. xiii. 1 is corrupt and meaningless,|| and it cannot be stated how long he reigned.

It is a little surprising to note the hold which Saul obtained even in Judah, perhaps through his victories over Amalek.‡ David's parents could not remain there with safety. The men of Ziph (1 Sam. xxiii. 9, xxvi. 1) brought Saul information of David's hiding-places, and those of Q'ilah (1 Sam. xxiii. 12) were quite ready to deliver him up. Nabal, a man of wealth and position, regards him as a servant who had run away from his master (1 Sam. xxv. 11). And just before the death of Saul we find that David was endeavouring to win the hearts of the headmen in Southern Judah by gifts out of the booty taken in his recent foray (1 Sam. xxx. 26 f.).

Perhaps the best way to estimate the general effect of Saul's reign is to observe what happened on his death. No one thought of abolishing the monarchical régime.¶ The only surviving son of Saul seems to have succeeded his father without question (except in Judah):

* This passage is not found in the Hebrew text nor in the Peshito, but is given by LXX and Latin. It appears to have fallen out by homoioteleuton (Driver, *Sam.*, 59; Smith, 67).

† Et liberabis populum suum de manibus inimicorum ejus qui in circuitu ejus sunt (x. 1). Comp. סבִּיב (xiv. 47).

‡ Lods, *u.s.*, 414.

§ *Cam. Anc. Hist.*, II. 391.

|| It does not appear in the LXX.

¶ See Lods, 416. Ewald, *Gesch. E.T.*, III. 51, 109.

"Abner took Eshbaal,* son of Saul, and brought him over to Mahanaim, and made him king over Gilead, and over the Asherites,† and over Jezreel, and over Ephraim, and over Benjamin, and over all Israel" (2 Sam. ii. 8).

This enumeration includes the whole of the future "Israel," which never really had any share in David or any part in the son of Jesse (2 Sam. xx. 1; 1 Kings xii. 16), and became ultimately a separate kingdom. If Saul, living simply in Gibeah with no capital or court, was able to build up this strong and abiding unity of the Ten Tribes on both sides of the Jordan, which maintained itself even after his defeat and death, it could only be by such victories as are mentioned in 1 Sam. xiv. 47. He had delivered them from their enemies round about.

In the light of these facts Saul must have been a much greater man than our sources generally represent him to have been. After the separation from Samuel, and before his jealous madness had overthrown his better qualities, he had effected the consolidation of the tribes into a nation, and he left a sovereignty to his son. Such facts do not remove the impression left upon our minds by his insane jealousy and persecution of David, but they make us conscious of high patriotic aims and strenuous effort to accomplish them. We are justified in discerning in his career a bright noon of achievement before the darkling gloom of madness and despair brought him to a tragic end.

W. W. CANNON.

CONFIRMATION AND CONSECRATION

Two interesting articles on the subject of Confirmation appeared in the March number of THEOLOGY. They contained, as might be expected in the writings of theological Professors, some scholarly treatment of the various conflicting ideas which have gathered round this Christian rite. Yet, though they greatly differed from each other in their expositions and conclusions, it is hardly too much to say that both articles must have tended to weaken in the minds of their readers any conviction that Confirmation is a sacramental act of fundamental importance and efficacy in the polity of the Catholic Church. It would, for instance, be difficult to maintain this position if Professor Easton's conclusion were accepted—that "to argue for its

* That this is the true form, see 1 Chron. viii. 33, ix. 39. In 1 Sam. xiv. 49 it is given as יֵשׁוּי; LXX, *Iession*; Lat. *Jessui*. There seems here to be a copyist's error in the M.T. Perhaps the original reading was יֵשׁוּיָהוּ.

† Reading הַאֲשֵׁרִי (Judg. i. 32); see Driver, *Sam.*, 186.

necessity from N.T. premisses is to abuse language." While (as the Editor of this magazine pointed out in his comments on these articles) "Professor Morris's logic carries him on to a doctrine both of Baptism and Confirmation which makes them simply didactic symbols."

But the purpose of the present article is not to criticize in any detail these two articles, but to submit that there is an aspect of Confirmation which, though it seems to have been ignored by these and many other writers on the subject, not only throws light upon some of the theoretical problems which confessedly belong to it, but also—a much more important matter—offers a simple Scriptural basis on which all who are concerned with the administration of this rite—Bishops, clergy, and lay-people—can take their stand, and from which an effective appeal can be made to Christian people who have been confirmed, at every stage of their career. And this aspect cannot perhaps be expressed in any more significant way than by the word "Consecration," which carries us farther into the scope and purpose of the Holy Spirit's action upon the individual life than the word "Confirmation." Certainly the latter word expresses etymologically the central effect of the Gift of the Spirit. According to the definition in the Scottish Revised Prayer Book (quoted by Professor Morris), "Confirmation is an apostolic and sacramental rite by which the Holy Spirit is given to complete our Baptism, so that we may be strengthened in our Christian life." And that is the burden of the ancient Collect in our own Order of Confirmation: "Strengthen them, we beseech Thee, by the Holy Ghost the Comforter." But what is the end and aim of this strengthening, confirming gift? In the Editor's comments on these articles, to which reference has already been made, he adumbrates a reply to this question (THEOLOGY, March number, p. 122): "The gift imparted by the Laying-on of Hands would seem to be clear: it is that of delegated authority, implying at once fellowship and responsibility. . . . The gift of the Spirit which the Samaritan converts needed (Acts viii.) was that of responsible fellowship on the new Israel over which the Apostles presided. And it is this same gift which the candidate for Confirmation still needs, and of which the Laying-on of Hands is the effective symbol." Surely we have here a seed-truth which deserves fuller exposition than it commonly receives in the many treatises and manuals of instruction issued for the benefit of the clergy and their candidates, and even (shall we dare to say?) in episcopal addresses at Confirmations; and it is supported by a wealth of Scripture teaching. It is, by the way, worth noting that, while the earliest use of the word "Consecration" in the A.V. refers to the priest-

hood of Aaron and his sons (Exod. xxviii. 3), later on (1 Chron. xxix. 5) it describes the challenge made by David to all his people to offer their gifts for the temple. "Who then is willing to consecrate his service ('to fill his hand,' marg.) this day unto the Lord?" And when we realize that in the N.T. the essential meaning of οἱ ἅγιοι, "the saints," is (to quote Dr. Lightfoot's definition of Col. i. 2), "the people consecrated to God, the Israel of the new Covenant," there is an *embarras de richesses* at our disposal for setting forth not so much the privilege as the responsibility which belongs to those who have submitted with some measure of faith to the Laying-on of Hands, for that is then seen to be nothing less than an ordination of the Christian as such to a priesthood, "a ministry which each Christian (in Dr. Westcott's words) is called to fulfil personally by his ordination for the common ministry of life." Two passages out of many which are pertinent to this subject may be emphasized, since they are often misinterpreted in their English form, even in the R.V.: (1) 1 Cor. xii.: "The manifestation of the Spirit was given to every man, πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον," not for his own profit, but, as Dr. Evans so well renders the phrase in the *Speaker's Commentary*, "with a view to the common weal"; and (2) Eph. iv. 12, where an intrusive comma (which the R.V. unfortunately still retains) obscures St. Paul's meaning that the object of the official ministry is "to equip the saints for a work of ministry." It would be easy to show by a catena of quotations from modern theologians of various schools of thought how this truth has been enforced. The present writer's own apprehension of it was long ago drawn from Dr. Milligan's book, *The Heavenly Priesthood of Christ*; and a passage from a University sermon on "Sacerdotalism" by Dr. Liddon is often quoted: "If Christian laymen would only believe in their hearts that they are really priests, we should soon escape from some of the difficulties which vex the Church of Christ. The difference between clergy and laity is only a difference of degree, not of kind." Yet even so the further truth that Confirmation is the occasion and means of this status being conferred upon the baptized has not received the emphasis which it deserves. Bishop Gore, e.g., in his work on the *Church and the Ministry*, barely touches on the subject—though it may fairly be said to have lain outside his main and much-needed purpose, which was, as he states in his preface, "to offer an apology for the principle of the apostolic succession." But Dr. Moberly, though the title of the third chapter of his *Ministerial Priesthood* is "The Relation between Ministry and Laity," makes no reference to Confirmation. Attention may be drawn to a little book by Bishop Webb, *The Priesthood of the Laity in the Body of Christ*, with its in-

roduction on "The Characteristic Grace of Confirmation," published in 1889. It deserves to be reprinted, for, short as it is, it contains a fuller and clearer treatment of the subject than any other book known, at any rate, to the present writer.

But even if this aspect of Confirmation is tolerably familiar to many, an attempt may be made to indicate its bearing on some of the difficulties which frequently find expression—for example, in those two articles published in March.

1. Does not the term "Consecration" help us to distinguish between the objective act and the subjective response to it? The fact that a person or thing has been set aside for a certain purpose, or even that the materials have been duly supplied for its realization, does not in itself ensure this result. A consecrated building may be disused or misused. A duly ordained priest may become unworthy of his calling. Yet in each case the validity and purpose of the consecration remains; and an appeal can always be made to it until it is formally and finally cancelled. It may be asked whether the appeal to the peculiar obligations which this rite of Confirmation lays on Christians is made as often or as effectively as it might be.

2. The precise relations between Baptism and Confirmation are confessedly not easy to define. But some attempts to define them would seem to the present writer rather to confuse than clear the issue. He would agree, for instance, with Professor Morris in refusing to accept Dr. Mason's view that "all relations of the Holy Spirit with us prior to our Confirmation are external relations." Can any action of the Holy Spirit on the individual soul in the Church or even in the world be other than an indwelling energy, though the manifestations and purposes of this energy must needs be infinitely various? Yet again the idea of "progressive instalments" of the Spirit's gifts seems to give a material quantitative aspect of His working which ill accords with the free immeasurable expansion and progress of His influence. But if we follow St. Augustine's teaching that "all sacramental acts have a certain similitude of the thing whereof they are Sacraments," we can make at the outset a sharp contrast between the two acts. The first is primarily a washing, a cleansing, and is so far negative in its meaning and value. It is "for the remission of sins." It looks backward on the state of sin and death from which the baptized are delivered. Whereas, if the Laying-on of Hands be regarded as signifying and effecting a consecration to responsible service, it looks forward. It would be easy to show how the outward sign of the Unction, the Chrism, which has superseded the Laying-on of Hands in some branches of the Church, and has fallen into abeyance in our own, carries even more vividly the same connotation. But

it is enough for our present purpose to suggest that the original outward similitude might be used to illustrate the inner contrast expressed in Acts ii. 38, 1 Cor. vi. 11, 2 Tim. ii. 21, Titus iii. 5, and many other kindred passages in the N.T. Certainly the grace of Baptism cannot be confined to its negative character. It is essentially a gift of life, "a washing of regeneration." But may it not be said that the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration has often failed to commend itself to the conscience of Christian people because it has been regarded simply as an *opus operatum* and detached from its due sequel? Even in the natural world the gift of life bestowed at birth needs to be followed by nurture if it is eventually to issue in an output of active energy. And we can never afford to forget, especially when infant Baptism is the normal practice, that it is a social act, and can only be justified on the presumption that the child will find within the shelter of the Spirit-bearing Church the nurture—normally given through the agency of a Christian home and school—needed for the due development of body, soul and spirit. The apostolic commission recorded in St. Matt. xxviii. records this requirement. Baptism is to be followed by discipleship and instruction. And all along the way, not least at the hour of death, the child-life in its filial dependence on the Father through its membership in Christ is to be maintained or, if need be, recovered through penitence and faith. The Church is for men and women of all ages and conditions a Home, a School. "I write unto you, little children, because ye know the Father . . . because your sins are forgiven you." And the aged Apostle accepts this position for himself. "We are the children of God." Yet can it be said that even this Baptismal privilege expresses the full scope or purpose of the Spirit's indwelling energy? Here again the analogy of natural human life helps us, for a point is reached in every rightly developed life when a career of active outgoing service opens out. Just so in the spiritual fellowship of the Church, the sacramental act of the Laying-on of Hands is not only to mark such a new departure, but actually endows the young life with the needful gifts of the Spirit. Do not the first two chapters of the Acts clearly set forth this new stage in the Church's life? Pentecost is often described as "the birthday of the Church." Yet, as has been well said,* "Pentecost was not the beginning of the Church. It was clearly there, formed and organized by Christ Himself, and only waiting to receive, by means of the Pentecostal gift, the promised endowment of the Spirit for its great work. Pentecost was its coming of age and the inheritance of its new spiritual life." It might be truly said that the little company of disciples, men and women, in the upper room, united as they

* *The Faith of the Church*, by Kenneth Mackenzie.

were in a joyful fellowship of faith, hope and charity, were in the position of those who at any time have been baptized in the Name of the Lord Jesus. They were "waiting for the promise of power" to enable them to witness for Christ. And when the Spirit came, each and all gave at once their witness, not by preaching to men, but by an ecstatic outburst of praise to God. And though St. Paul, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians (chap. xiv.), plainly refuses to regard the *γλωσσολαλία* as the chief or safest proof of the Spirit's presence and power, the account of that first Pentecost still stands to show that the Godward attitude of joyful worship is to be the first and main witness of the indwelling gifts of the Spirit. "Pentecost," it has been finely said,* "was the first *Te Deum* of the infant Church." It is then the Consecration to a priesthood of worship, followed by a ministry of manward service, which formed the sequel to the cleansing, regenerating gift of Baptism. And when a little later in the development of the Church's life we find the Laying-on of Hands not only employed in conferring an official ministry of the Seven (Acts vi.), but also upon the baptized as such the common ministry of service† we are ready to recognize the truth that "Confirmation is the Pentecost of the individual soul."‡ One of the chief proof-texts on Confirmation is, of course, Heb. vi. 2. But the distinction between it and Baptism seems to be amplified in the accumulated phrases of ver. 4, where "to be a partaker of the Holy Ghost" and "to taste the power of the world to come" marks a spiritual advance on "the enlightenment" which is assured in Baptism.

3. But those who wish to place the relation of Confirmation to Baptism on a sure Scriptural basis will be impelled to seek, as most students of the subject have done, some light upon it, not only in the Pentecostal descent of the Spirit on the Church as recorded in the Acts, but further back, in the Gospel record of the Lord's Baptism and the endowment of the Spirit which followed it. What correspondence can be traced here between the spiritual career of the Incarnate Lord and that of His members? We surely cannot regard His Baptism at the Jordan as corresponding to ours. He did not need in His own Person any cleansing or regenerating act. By submitting to John's Baptism He was identifying Himself with the sinful race which He had come to redeem. But He Himself was "conceived by the Holy Ghost" "without spot of sin." In His physical human birth He "was born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." Yet in

* *The Genesis of the Church*, by H. Cotterill, Bishop of Edinburgh, 1872 (out of print).

† Cf. 1 Cor. iv. 1 with 1 Pet. iv. 10.

‡ *Confirmation in the Apostolic Age*, by Bishop Chase, the last sentence.

the thirty sinless years which followed we may reverently regard His experience as akin to that of every baptized child who is being nurtured and trained through human agencies by the indwelling power of the Spirit—"increasing in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man." He was learning and waiting—not yet witnessing to the world or working in it—till the point of His career is reached when the spring of "living water" which was always welling up pure and fresh within His human soul began after His consecration at the Jordan to flow forth into the world, first in His active mission of teaching and healing power, and then in the supreme suffering of the Cross. It was under this figure (which he drew from the Old Testament Scriptures) of the "living water" that He framed His promise of the gift of the Spirit to all who should believe on Him. The life-giving stream was to "flow out of" them when they had received the Spirit, which "was not yet given" (John vii. 38, 39). We might go on to consider the Lord's discourses in the Upper Chamber and to enquire whether such words as "I have ordained you that ye should go and bring forth fruit" (John xv. 16), or, again, the Great Commission given after the Resurrection (xx. 22), are to be applied exclusively to the Apostles and their successors in the official ministry or to all members of the Church in their vocation and ministry. Dr. Westcott, in a well-known passage,* insists that we are to regard this commission as "the charter of the Christian Church," though he speaks in the same paragraph of "the divine necessity by which the different persons and channels through which the manifold graces of the Christian life are administered were afterwards marked out," and continues: "It is surely remarkable that St. John, by whom this commission is recorded, and St. Peter, to whom representative power was given, stand out among the writers of the New Testament as dwelling on the priestly office of all Christians." But such a discussion could carry us beyond the due limits of this article: and it may suffice here to submit that the Laying-on of Hands in Confirmation, administered as it is by the chief officers of the Church, is a genuine ordination of the laity to priestly and ministerial responsibilities, and forms a real nexus between the two aspects of the Church's life and energy which are too often set in needless antagonism to each other.

And, it may be added, we may find here a motive and inspiration for worship and social service which is altogether in harmony with the best ideals of Christian thought and feeling today. Worship takes on a new value and beauty when it is no longer regarded simply as a means of "getting good" for

* *Revelations of the Risen Lord*, c. iv.

ourselves, but as a "bounden duty and service" which we joyfully offer to God in the power of the Holy Spirit and in union with the Sacrifice of Christ and in fellowship with the whole Church on behalf of the world. And while the appeal to save our own souls from perdition seems to have largely lost its spell today, the call to "stir up the gifts of the Spirit of power and of love and of discipline which is in us by the laying on of hands" should always form an attractive and potent message to the young and active even more than to those whose opportunities and powers of social service on earth are passing away. But, "the gifts of the Spirit verily and indeed received by the faithful in Confirmation covers the whole field of life, and in its potency and promise reaches on into the unknown and unimagined future."*

F. E. CARTER.

* Bishop Chase, *Confirmation in the Apostolic Age*, p. 114. He suggests that the exhortation to Timothy (quoted above, 2 Tim. vi. 7) may refer to his Confirmation rather than to his official Ordination.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

AMONG contributors to the present issue, Mr. Lester-Garland is a former Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford, and Canon Carter was until a few years ago Dean of Bocking. The latter's article was elicited by two articles on Confirmation which we published last March, and it seems to us a very learned and beautiful exposition of the Church's teaching.

The *Truro Diocesan Gazette* for November contains an interesting article, over the initials W. T., on "The Ministry of Women," and discusses the theological principles which govern the restriction of the priesthood to men only. It deserves to be widely read.

The Rev. F. L. Cross, of Pusey House, Oxford, sends us the following note on "The Myth of July 14, 1833":

The idea that the Oxford Movement began with Keble's Assize Sermon, preached in St. Mary's, Oxford, on July 14, 1833, is a myth. The sermon was but one of a whole series of events which preceded the publication of the Tracts, and by no means the most important of them. Indeed, comparatively little significance seems to have been attached to this particular sermon at the time. William Palmer, the earliest chronicler of the Movement, does not even mention it; this is all the more significant, because Palmer deals in some detail both in his (1843) *Narrative* and in his (1883) *Introduction* with the events connected with the year 1833. Frederick Oakeley, who saw events from the very opposite pole from Palmer, likewise makes no reference to it in his *Historical Notes on the Tractarian Movement*. Isaac Williams, a close friend of Keble since 1823, is equally silent in his *Autobiography*, though a reference to it would have come in very naturally. Thomas Mozley, in his *Reminiscences of Oriel*, has nothing to tell his readers about it. There is no reference to it in Hurrell Froude's published *Remains*, in spite of the fact that Froude was a Fellow of Oriel and intimate with Keble at the time. The famous meeting at Hadleigh was planned some weeks before the sermon was preached, and there is no record of any discussion of it at the meeting itself, which took place at the end of July. It is not referred to in Gladstone's published *Letters* (edited by D. C. Lathbury). Liddon, who himself held the view which has now become traditional as to the importance of the sermon, writes of Pusey that "no record of his sense of the importance of this manifesto survives"; and notes that a copy of the published sermon marked "from the author" and in Pusey's possession at his death was uncut. Neither Coleridge nor Dr. Lock, in their lives of Keble, adduces any contemporary estimates.

The only contemporary evidence, as far as the present writer is aware, which attaches considerable significance to the sermon, is a passage in one of J. B. Mozley's letters, written on July 30, 1833. Mozley wrote that he regretted that he had not heard it himself, "as I cannot help thinking it," he says, "a kind of exordium of a great revolution—shall I call it?—coming on, whether rapidly or slowly we cannot tell, but at

any rate most surely." Mozley then proceeds to enlarge on this theme at some length. Incidentally, he says that "Pusey of Christ Church, a person of excellent principles, thinks some passages rather too pointed," an assertion which reads rather as if the author believed that Pusey had read the sermon. (If so, it must have been in another copy from that sent him by the author.)

If, with this one exception, contemporary thinkers attached very little significance to the Assize Sermon, how has such importance come to be ascribed to it? This question is easily answered. The reference to it in Newman's *Apologia*, written over thirty years after the event, has been decisive. "I have even considered and kept the day as the start of the religious movement of 1833."

That Newman should have attached an altogether disproportionate importance to the event was very natural in the circumstances. He had been abroad for over six months; and, after many adventures, had reached Oxford again but a few days previously, full of health and vigour and energy. As his diary shows, he had found the Sundays abroad very distasteful. Sunday, July 14, was his first Sunday back in his parish church. He had already convinced himself of the necessity of active steps being taken for the defence of the Church against the "reforming" party, and Keble outlined in the Assize Sermon the very policy which Newman wanted to see carried into effect. What more natural than that the sermon should have made an impression on him far greater than it made on most of his contemporaries? They were familiar with Keble's articles which had recently appeared on the subject of Reform in the *British Magazine* and had heard University sermons Sunday by Sunday. For Newman, on the other hand, the sermon was a trumpet-call which was heard by ears not dulled by familiarity, and he dated the beginning of the Movement accordingly.

This would explain J. B. Mozley's enthusiasm, for he was one of Newman's most intimate disciples at the time, and had discussed the ecclesiastical situation at length with Newman a day or two previous to the sermon.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester. July, 1932.

This number contains, as well as literary articles, important contributions by Professor Conway and Professor Dodd. Professor Conway writes on "The Etruscan Influence on Roman Religion." He traces to an Etruscan source the more repellent side of Roman religion. The Etruscan mind delighted in scenes of blood and of torture and there was a developed demonology. When the Orphic mysteries reached them they were perverted to suit this mentality. Ideas concerning a way of escape from the pains of the lower world, to be accomplished by the payment of a proper fee to a sacerdotal caste, are peculiarly Etruscan. "Intense superstition, linked with fear, is linked also with cruelty"—many men famous in Roman history for deeds of blood and cruelty bear names that are of Etruscan origin, such as Sulla, Cinna, Catilina, Casca and others. Maecenas, another Etruscan, though he served Rome well and helped

literature, had a private life which was "typically Etruscan." The Emperor Nerva is the only exception. In a later century Dante derives the more gruesome features of his "Inferno" from the same source. The article is well illustrated with reproductions of Etruscan remains in the domain of art, and these fully bear out what is written in the text. Professor Dodd treats of the Gospel parables. He argues against allegorizing interpretations—where these occur in our texts they are in all probability the interpolations of a later age, as in the parable of the Sower. The parables are apposite to the time and circumstances of their original delivery, "to their particular setting in the crisis which the ministry of Jesus created." They must neither be minimized into lessons of general morality nor explained by the ideas and needs of later generations. There are further articles on various topics, such as pre-historic man, Archbishop Chichele, and "Letters of the first Babylonian Dynasty." It is a very interesting number, but the reader misses Dr. Mingana and his "Woodbrooke Studies."

W. R. V. BRADE.

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. July, 1932.

In this number Dom Lottin continues his historical survey of the doctrine of conscience in the Middle Ages, dealing here with the problem of whether conscience always obliges even when in error. The Franciscan school—e.g., Alexander of Hales—teach that conscience can never oblige to the omission of a good act or to the commission of an evil one. This is questioned in various ways by the other schools, who tend to say that action against conscience can never escape a certain sinfulness since such action implies a wilful rejection of what the man thinks to be right at the time. There is no merit, however, in following a misguided conscience. St. Albert the Great teaches on these lines, but demands that the delivery of conscience shall be clear and certain to the man about to act. St. Thomas also agrees that all conscience obliges, since the objective moral order only binds the will in so far as it is perceived by the individual. But for an act to be rightly called morally good it must be good in the objective order; for an act to be morally bad it is sufficient that it is apprehended as bad, whether it be so in the objective order or not. Thus, so long as the misguided conscience exists it is impossible to escape sinning. St. Thomas will not allow that it can be morally good to perform an evil act at the dictate of a misguided conscience, though that would seem, says Dom Lottin, to follow from some of his premises.

Two Latin articles further discuss various problems of a medico-theological nature concerning certain diriment impediments to marriage. There is a sketch of the history of Western Collections of Canons from the time of the false decretals to that of Gratian. A review is given of a new work of Grabmann which seems of importance for the history of Latin Averroism. Many other reviews and the usual full theological bibliography are also contained in this number.

W. R. V. BRADE.

British Museum Quarterly. Vol. viii., Nos. 1 and 2.

These numbers illustrate and describe a remarkable example of Florentine engraving, a *Descent from the Cross*, hitherto unknown. The print, in which the general influence of Botticelli's style is apparent, probably dates from the close of the fifteenth century.

The Museum has recently acquired a fine copy of Suetonius' *Lives of the Twelve Cæsars* written evidently in France towards the end of the twelfth century. Other important acquisitions are a series of five charters relating to Byland Abbey: three are of the twelfth century; a fourth is a confirmation dated 1335 by Sir William Malebys of all previous grants made by his ancestors to the abbey. A fifth, written in the late fourteenth century, pretends to be of the twelfth, and is thus an interesting example of a mediæval forgery.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xxiii., No. 2.

Dr. G. H. Box contributes a useful article on *The Idea of Intermediation in Jewish Theology*. He calls attention to the fact that Dr. Streeter—in common with others, of course—in his *Four Gospels*, regards the use of the word *Memra* as a convenient substitute for the anthropomorphic expressions of the Old Testament. Streeter quotes with approval a paragraph from the late Professor G. F. Moore's article, "Intermediaries in Jewish Theology," in the *Harvard Theological Review* (January, 1922): "The expression the 'Word' or the Dwelling is not meant to be in any sense a metaphysical or theological conception; it is a purely philological subterfuge—a kind of verbal smoke-screen to conceal the difficulty presented by the anthropomorphic language of the original."

As a matter of fact there are many anthropomorphisms in the Targum, and there are instances where the Targum inserts *Memra* even when there is no danger of anthropomorphism (*The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, J. Abelson, p. 151 ff.). Hence Dr. Box does not find it hard to show, in agreement with the commentator Nahmanides, that the term *Memra* has a significance and a theological value of its own. Words are not mere counters even in Rabbinic literature; they carry with them certain implications. The term *Memra* is not, of course, used to denote a separate personality, but it expresses God Himself in certain modes of His manifestation.

Dr. Cecil Roth supplies materials for an interesting chapter in the history of the Marranos, Jews who, under compulsion, adopted an outward show of Christianity. Immanuel Aboab, born 1555, died 1628, devoted his life to an endeavour to stir up slack members of the Marrano community to an observance of the religion of their fathers. He urged them to be ready to sacrifice all worldly advantages for the spiritual treasures of Judaism. He begged all who were willing to listen to him to study daily "the Holy Law and dedicate certain hours of day and night to this duty, learning to recite his prayers in the Holy Tongue." To a family almost reduced to beggary as a result of their return to Judaism he gave financial assistance, entreating them to stand firm in their allegiance: "Come, dear brothers, to serve the Lord; confide in His mercy; try it; for I certify and promise you that He will succour you on the way, where you least expect it." Dr. Roth has given us a fascinating glimpse into the inner life of the Marranos and "into the strivings and workings of a noble Jewish soul."

R. D. MIDDLETON.

The Journal of Religion. Vol. xii., No. 4.

The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought. Vol. ix., No. 3.

A discussion of religious imperialism, described by its author, Clifford Manshardt, as "the attitude of mind which says that that which I believe should be believed by everyone else; and which is willing to undergo hardships and make sacrifices for the extension of that belief" deserves the consideration of those who are interested in missionary work. The writer holds that though the imperialistic form of organization is passing, the imperialistic missionary message has undergone little change. Underlying the missionary enterprise is the assumption of Christian conquest. The approach of missions, as conceived by the Jerusalem Conference, is still the approach of conquest. But the present-day view of religion as a natural process of development gives little ground for any religion regarding itself as superior *per se*. Its superiority is not the result of divine sanction, but how it functions in everyday life. When religion comes to be looked upon as man's search after the good life, the situation changes. The primary missionary emphasis shifts from converts to co-operation. Christianity has in time past been too much of a dividing force and too little of a co-operator. We have worked upon the assumption that we alone carry the medicine that will cure the world's ills, and we have refused to call in the experts of the non-Christian religions for consultation. We have too often chosen the wrong way of making Christian converts. We have offered inducements to men to accept our religion, and we have violated individual personalities. But in offering his treasure, the motive of the co-operator is wholly unselfish. His concern is not primarily in building up a Christian community, but in establishing the Kingdom of God in its truest sense. The foe of proselytization, he nevertheless believes in the necessity of conversion, but he does not believe that conversion of necessity involves a change of religion. On the other hand, he would not deny a man the right of religious change. To receive an earnest seeker is a far different proposition from directing the high-powered batteries of Christian propaganda upon a man in an attempt to break down his resistance. In such activity we will have no part.

On somewhat the same lines is an interesting article by W. R. Taylor in the *Canadian Journal*. The author urges us to distinguish between Jew and Jew, and to draw into the fellowship of the Church all those Jews who, like Julian Rosenwald of Chicago, share the spirit of Christ.

On both of these a useful commentary is provided by a discussion of Religion's success in the Roman Empire, by H. Mick in the *Canadian Journal*, which sees in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures a great repository of permanent and appealing truth and, most of all, in Christ an ideal Character to inspire the hearts of men with an impassioned love.

The same issue contains a useful study of *Formgeschichte*, in which the author, Ian F. Mackinnon, concludes we may accept *Formgeschichte* as a corrective to much that has been loose and ill-founded in our statements about the Gospels, remembering that such a study can never say the last word on the personality of Jesus.

H. S. MARSHALL.

REVIEWS

THE TEACHING OF JESUS. Studies of its Form and Content.
By T. W. Manson, M.A. Cambridge University Press. 15s.

Mr. Manson has given us a very interesting study of certain aspects of the teaching of our Lord, and one which, from the standpoint both of critical method and of exegesis, shows marked freshness and originality. So far as the literary criticism of the Gospels is concerned, Mr. Manson follows Canon Streeter in accepting the hypothesis of a Proto-Luke, though he takes a different view of its nature. He is not content, however, with the task of assigning the various sayings of our Lord to their literary sources, but superimposes upon this necessary critical formulation another equally important critical work—namely, the classification of our Lord's sayings according to the groups of persons to whom they were addressed. Thus (in addition to the usual Mk, Q, M, and L) we have also D for those sections of the teaching which were addressed to the disciples, G for those addressed to the general public, P for those addressed to the religious authorities, and so too various combinations of these. The classification is given in appendices at the end of the book; but it is applied carefully throughout, and supplies a very useful bridge from the literary to the historical criticism of the Gospel story.

The dominating idea of Mr. Manson's exegesis of our Lord's teaching is the conception of the Remnant, which he regards as central to it. He traces this idea from its origins in the Old Testament, where the Remnant represented those elements in Israel which were faithful to Jehovah and accepted the teaching of the prophets. The Exile marked a turning-point in the development of the doctrine, which bifurcated towards two different ideals. One was that of Deutero-Isaiah, which conceived of the Remnant as "a *saving* few," the other that of Ezekiel, for which it was "a *saved* few." The latter conception underlay the growth of Judaism, the martyrdom of the *Hasidim* in the Maccabean wars, and the Pharisaism of our Lord's day. The former came to flower in Christianity. Mr. Manson finds this former idea personified in "the Servant of Jehovah" of Deutero-Isaiah and also in "the Son of Man" of Daniel and of Enoch; and he regards this interpretation as the clue to the right understanding of "the Son of Man" on our Lord's lips. So far as Daniel is concerned, I think that Mr. Manson is right; and I have myself suggested* that the occurrence of the title on the lips of St. Stephen is closely connected with this identification. But that the title in *Enoch* should be interpreted in

* *The Approach to Christianity*, pp. 112-118.

this way seems to me much more doubtful. I cannot help feeling that here, and still more in his interpretation of "the Son of Man" on our Lord's lips, Mr. Manson is somewhat pressing the evidence into the mould of his theory. One may readily admit that these associations may have played a large part in determining our Lord's choice of the mysterious and equivocal title, *barnāshā*, to denote Himself as Messiah; and the emphasis which he lays on Christ's warning to His disciples that their calling will involve a like humiliation to His is most valuable; but I cannot think that the interpretation which regards "the Son of Man" as a corporate title, even though at the end Jesus alone remains entitled to use it, will prove finally convincing.

A similar overpressing of the evidence is to be found, I think, in the sharp cleavage which Mr. Manson makes between teaching given before St. Peter's confession at Cæsarea Philippi and that given after it. The point is most noticeable in the admirable chapter on "God as Father." That St. Peter's confession opened the way for clearer and more detailed revelation of the Father may well be true; but to limit the revelation to the later period, and to assign to that period sayings in the Sermon on the Mount, on the ground that, since the Sermon is composite, they may "come anywhere," is surely to treat the evidence arbitrarily. And the reason that Mr. Manson gives for our Lord's injunction of silence as to His Messiahship is surely inadequate. "The answer to the question," he says, "must be the perfectly simple one that the Messiahship of Jesus was something which each man must discover for himself by his own insight and understanding." Yet what our Lord said was that, even in the case of His chief disciple, it had been revealed by His Father in heaven.

These criticisms and cautions, however, must not be allowed to detract from the real appreciation and study which this book seems to me to merit. Mr. Manson has brought to his work wide reading, careful analysis, and a theological discernment which, even when we disagree with him, is full of teaching.

E. G. SELWYN.

NOTICES

EVERYMAN'S TALMUD. By the Rev. Dr. A. Cohen. Pp. xl+420. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1932. 7s. 6d. net.

THE TALMUD. By Dudley Wright, with a Foreword by Herbert M. J. Loewe, M.A. Pp. 145. Williams and Norgate. 1932. 7s. 6d. net.

The Talmud has two sides, the purely Jewish—*i.e.*, the rules of how to live ceremonially correct lives in accordance with the commands of the Pentateuch—and the world-wide side of doctrine, whether this refers to God or to man.

It is this latter side, and this alone, which Dr. Cohen has endeavoured to summarize. For both Antisemites and their opponents have been only too apt to make mistakes—often very serious mistakes—about what the Talmud does say. Not, however (as Dr. Cohen is careful to remind us) that these statements of doctrine, etc., have any binding force, save so far as Truth itself has force. The only part of the Talmud which is binding is the final result in each case of discussions which refer to Jewish life, the Halaka, or the Way. Other things are all Haggada (perhaps “narrative”). But it is just from Haggada that Antisemites draw their weapons. Yet Haggada is really little more than the remarks about doctrine, etc., sometimes very casual remarks, and perhaps dependent on local and transitory causes or even semi-jocular sayings, to alleviate the tedium of a wearisome discussion, made by individual Rabbis, according as they were moved by deep or but moderate spirituality of heart.

Hence it is not possible to draw up a hard-and-fast Creed or Confession of Jewish Faith from the Talmudic writings. One can but say: This and that statement of doctrine, or of ethics, or of folk-lore, is found therein. And even this is not put forth as the expressed resolution of the majority (as is each rule in Halaka), but only as the opinion (serious or otherwise) of the Rabbi to whom it is attributed. Just at this point, indeed, Dr. Cohen fails us. For although he conscientiously gives us always the full reference in which the quotation may be found, he does not (for some reason or other) add the name of the Rabbi in whose name it is repeated. Strack and Billerbeck's large commentary on the New Testament is much more satisfactory in this respect. For it invariably quotes by name and adds the approximate date. After all, scholars are inclined to believe more and more that the Rabbinic sources given in the Talmudic writings are generally to be trusted.

Here are two brief quotations: “According to Talmudic law, should there be a clash in a son's duties to his father or his mother, he must give preference to his father. A Rabbi was asked, ‘If my father should say, “Give me a drink of water,” and my mother should make the same request, to whom must I attend first?’ He answered, ‘Leave the honouring of your mother and honour your father, because both you and your mother have the duty of honouring him.’” (pp. 121 *seq.*).

Again: “A home where deference is paid to parents is graced with the Divine Presence. When a man honours his father and his mother, the Holy One, blessed be He, says, ‘I ascribe it as though I dwelt with them and I was honoured’” (p. 122).

Mr. Wright's book is on other lines. It does not profess to give quotations from the Talmud, save by the way, but only to tell us what

the Talmud is not, and thus to lead us to infer what it really is. A translation of a page or two would have made his explanation very much clearer. His last chapter tells us of the short-sighted way in which Christians of mediæval times burnt cartloads of manuscripts of the Talmud and other Jewish books. Alas, alas! The consequence is that Christian students of Judaism are terribly hindered today by such vandalism. Another chapter of interest gives us many details about the lives of the various Rabbis who had to do with the formation of the Talmud. Indeed, for practical use this is the best chapter of all. We wish that Mr. Wright had been careful to supply exact references for his quotations from modern authors. "Graetz says" this, "Milman says" that; but where, and how, they so say we are not told.

A. LUKYN WILLIAMS.

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF HOLY WEEK, ITS SERVICES AND CEREMONIAL.

J. W. Tyrer. Oxford University Press. 25s.

The whole Church is Mr. Tyrer's debtor for this admirable work of scholarship. Its price is high for a volume of 180 pages; but it is in every sense a standard book, and the form is worthy of the matter.

The book falls into two parts. The former deals with the history of Holy Week in the Church as a whole from the first century to the end of the seventh. The latter confines itself to the West and provides a detailed account of all the Holy Week services according to the principal rites and uses. In the first part the author traces the development of the Pascha from the primitive commemoration of the Death and Resurrection of the Lord, short and intense, with more emphasis on the Death than on the Dying, through the transitional period (third century) in which Holy Week stood out by itself as the only compulsory fasting time of the Christian year, to the final arrangement (from the fourth century) when the Great Week came to stand as a climax to the long penitential season of Lent. In the second part the various rites and services of the Week are traced to their origin and described in their manifold varieties. Among the less familiar facts brought to our notice the following may be selected: The extinguishing of the lights at Tenebræ seems to have always been a piece of deliberate symbolism: they must have been extinguished long before dawn. If this is so, it is an addition to the very short list of ceremonial observances whose origin was other than practical. The most ancient of the distinctive ceremonies of Holy Week is the blessing of the font, which can be traced to the third century. The most modern, of course, is the Three Hours' devotion, which was first used in South America at the end of the seventeenth century. The Good Friday Mass of the Presanctified is not earlier, even in the East, Mr. Tyrer believes, than the sixth century; and he therefore questions Fr. Freestone's view that the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament in both kinds at Constantinople in 404 was an exceptional arrangement in view of the Good Friday Communion. In regard to Holy Saturday, the Anglican custom of a special synaxis in commemoration of our Lord's Burial (as distinguished from the great vigiliary Mass) is not so singular as is generally supposed. The Ambrosian rite has such a service, unchanged since the twelfth century, with a Gospel almost identical with that of the Book of Common Prayer; and there are indications of a similar service in the *Missale Bobbiense*.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

DIFFICULTIES: BEING A CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT THE CATHOLIC RELIGION BETWEEN RONALD KNOX AND ARNOLD LUNN. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 7s. 6d.

The names of the authors are a sufficient guarantee to the reader that this somewhat unusual form of theological discussion will not be found lacking in interest or vivacity. The method adopted is that Mr. Lunn attacks various elements in the Roman Catholic system and Father Knox replies. The subjects discussed seem to be taken at random; and we find ourselves concerned successively with the Papal claims, the Inquisition, the doctrine of Hell, the theory of Indulgences, the meaning of Biblical inspiration, and even the Nature and Being of God Himself.

The method adopted imposes three serious limitations on the value of the book. In the first place, Father Knox is throughout at a disadvantage, because he is on the defensive, while his critic is under no necessity of producing an alternative system of belief. Thus he speaks of "we Anglicans," but no Anglican system of thought can be deduced from his letters: he firmly rejects Modernism, yet he propounds a doctrine of God which is more revolutionary than much Modernist thought. And many who find it difficult to accept the traditional theory of Hell would yet feel distrustful of a thinker who can affirm that his disbelief in eternal torture is stronger than his belief in God. Secondly, the strength of Romanism—and indeed of any form of Catholicism—lies in the fact that it is a coherent system of thought, not a mere bundle of separable theories: but Mr. Lunn's method of attack never recognizes this, and makes it difficult for Father Knox to make it clear, though he endeavours to do so in one or two of his letters. Thirdly, any serious discussion of Romanism in contrast with other types of Christianity ought to come to grips first of all with the ultimate meaning of Authority and its basis in the Incarnation. This was made clear in Father Vernon's apology and the reply of Father Milner-White and Father Wilfrid Knox: but it is never really faced in this book.

Within these limitations there is much in the correspondence which is of value. Even the ingenuity of Father Knox finds it difficult to justify Rome's present attitude to Biblical inspiration, and he fails completely to defend Mr. Belloc's astonishing claim that the Roman Church has never been guilty of literalism. We cannot help feeling also that Father Knox is uncomfortable in his defence of Indulgences, and would gladly give up the effort-if loyalty to his Church allowed him to do so. Nor can he be considered happy in his explanation of our Lord's temptations, in which he is dangerously near to Docetism.

On the other hand, Father Knox's defence of the traditional doctrine of God, and in particular his philosophy of prayer, is a really valuable reply to a criticism which is popular today. And may we not add that he has laid bare the shallowness of much of what is called "the modern mind" by extorting from Mr. Lunn the amazing confession that "I should not 'care a rap' whether there were one God, many Gods, or no God, provided that the things I care for could be preserved"? Against all such beliefs Catholicism stands as the bulwark of theocentric religion.

PERCY HARTILL.

THE HOUSE OF PILGRIMAGE. By S. C. Carpenter, B.D. S.P.C.K. 6s.

Those who have "sat under" the Master of the Temple will hear his voice in every page of these sermons. His aim is to express the beauty and truth of the Christian religion in terms of modern thought and literature. In the line of Christian Platonists, he makes his appeal to spiritual experience; but it is corporate experience rather than individual. His landscape, illuminated by flashes of delightful humour, is as wide as human nature itself. The sermons follow the course of the Christian Year. In Advent the apocalyptic element in Christianity is illustrated by the changes in the world since 1914. On Christmas Day we read of the "exquisite rightness" of the Incarnation, and how every mother can say, "Here is all heaven in a cradle," because all heaven did once lie in the manger. The symbolic value of the gifts of the Magi shows how material things can open a pathway into the eternal world. On Passion Sunday we learn that "by sacrifice you touch a nerve in things; you co-operate in an eternal purpose." On Easter Day our thoughts are led to heaven and eternity, beyond, behind, and within this world of time and space. The Syro-Phœnician woman teaches the duty of waiting; and the "house swept and garnished" that the four cardinal virtues are "not enough." The volume ends with sermons on Cowper and Hooker, and a half-humorous essay on the Lambeth Conference in the style of Master Richard himself. We are almost grateful for the only slip we have noticed, a slight misquotation of the Greek of St. John x. 11, because it leads us to ask whether Jesus did call Himself "the Beautiful Shepherd." ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ποιμὴν ὁ καλός may mean "I am the Shepherd, the Fair One," with a reference to the Shepherd Lover of the Song of Songs (cf. Cant. i. 16). The allusion would be familiar to our Lord's hearers, and no one could expound it more happily than the preacher of these sermons.

J. H. McCUBBIN.

BROADCAST MINDS. By Ronald Knox. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

In spite of Father Ronald's "We are growing old, Professor Huxley, we are growing old!" there is still much of the undergraduate in him, and something of the schoolboy; his agility of mind, his humour and his evident delight in unmasking the pretentiousness, the false logic and the false quantities of the "Omniscients" make his adventures in their society exceedingly entertaining; the reader of *Broadcast Minds* is rewarded by a view of Professor Julian Huxley "prostrating himself before reality in a simple form of ritual" and of Lord Russell acting as confessor "not on strictly teetotal occasions"; we are led back to the author's childhood, when he was given "cod-liver oil floating on a glass of port," and "deriving the moral notions I have from my aunts, who inspired me (I hope) with becoming respect, but not (I protest) with any Freudian reactions."

But what is Broadcast-mindedness? Briefly it is the habit of acquiring one's opinions second-hand from experts. Experts on one subject have a way of assuming omniscience on all, and a faculty of confusing issues by a grand parade of knowledge of by no means certain facts; they hypnotize the mind into a sense of nothing else but its own ignorance, and they belittle Christianity in the eyes of the vulgar not so much by direct argument as by suggestion and a scarcely veiled contempt. Through

all the work of those whom Father Knox styles the "Omniscients" is the implied or expressed assumption that there is a deadly conflict between Religion and Science, in which any person of ordinary intelligence can see that victory already lies with the latter.

Father Knox is never tired of proclaiming that there is not philosophically or practically any conflict. It was a Victorian superstition. History shows the Church always in favour of advancing knowledge: the episode of Galileo was the one excusable exception. And philosophically, buttressed as the Catholic Religion is by the "Five Proofs," it is hardly conceivable that physical discovery or theory could shake her doctrine of God.

There are some apologists today who are turning to the revolution in modern physical theory for support. Father Knox (rightly, I think) will have none of this—*non tali auxilio*; he also, surely wrongly, discountenances the stress we are laying on the argument from religious experience.

It is striking how all the writers he deals with shirk metaphysics, even his biggest antagonist, Lord Russell; this puts them on to another plane, and makes the conflict uneven. If we argue about God's existence we must necessarily embark on metaphysics; that is what Father Knox sees and the others do not want to see.

Is it quite fair for Father Knox to speak in one place of Kant and the line of philosophers from Descartes as subjective products of Protestantism, and in another, when he is in difficulties about space-time, to fly to the Kantian doctrine for support?

You can hardly fail to learn a great deal from this book, and to be very much amused.

W. J. FERRAR.

THE RATIONAL FAITH. By the Rev. Bede Frost, O.S.B. Philip Allan.
3s. 6d.

These addresses were delivered at a Teaching Mission in St. Augustine's Church, South Kensington, and we may say at once that they are admirably designed for such a purpose. Their clearness and directness will have a steadying effect on those who are tempted to make religious doubt an excuse for slackness in thought or practice. "The God who Is," the nature and fall of man, "Who is Jesus Christ?" "The Imitation of Christ," and the Mass, are some of the subjects treated. In the last address, "Prayer and Mortification," Fr. Frost deals with the subject which he has made his own, that of Mental Prayer, and here he is at his best. He has an obvious sympathy with Roman books and Roman methods of instruction, and some may wish that Anglican theology were more fully represented in the list of books recommended; but he speaks to all, and we do not think any will feel that he has sacrificed the preaching of Christ to the interests of any school of thought. Perhaps more should have been made of the inspiration of the individual; in this connection addresses on the Holy Spirit, Baptism, and the reading of Holy Scripture would have been illuminating. Some of Fr. Frost's remarks on those who do not agree with him might have been revised before publication—e.g., "the Church has never had any real sympathy with Platonism" (apropos of Dr. Inge) on p. 97; and on p. 86, "the modern philosopher, like James, Bergson or Russell, does not live in a world of

facts, but in a world of dreams." In the reference on the same page to the eclipse of May 29, 1919, "moon" is an error for "sun."

J. H. McCUBBIN.

THE NECESSITY OF MODERNISM. By R. G. Griffiths. Skeffington and Son. 3s. 6d.

This book has some importance as a quasi-official exposition of the aims of the Modern Churchmen's Union. The Modernism here set forth is something quite different from the Liberalism which claimed toleration for all views. Disregarding the obvious facts that traditionalism is the creed of an overwhelming majority of practising Christians, and that Continental Protestantism has reacted strongly from the rationalizing views which Anglo-Saxon Liberals took over, it dogmatically asserts that only a certain attenuated body of belief can be held by modern-minded men. "A revival of religion on common-sense lines" is advocated. No attempt is made to understand those who differ—witness the statement that Anglo-Catholics "wish to facilitate . . . adoration of the elements." However, amidst much that is painful, let us cherish the assertion that Modernism has rediscovered the humanity of Jesus, "*whilst holding firmly to the truth of His Godhead.*"

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

ESTABLISHMENT IN ENGLAND. Being Essays on Church and State. By Sir Lewis Dibdin. Macmillan. 7s. 6d.

The clamour for disestablishment has largely subsided in circles outside the Church of England, and probably within the Church the views of the Bishop of Durham are supported by few. But some modification in the relations of Church and State will be generally agreed to be desirable, and among the more urgent matters for consideration in the Church Assembly is the question, What should be the Final Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical causes?

As long ago as 1883 the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts brought great learning and research to bear on this subject. In 1906 the Royal Commission on Church Discipline recognized that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council failed to serve its purpose, inasmuch as the consciences of a section of the clergy forbade them to appear before it. Sir Lewis Dibdin was a member of this Commission, as also of the recent Commission of the Church Assembly, which will probably recommend that the Final Court should be one of lay judges appointed by the Crown to hear appeals from the ecclesiastical courts, but that any question of doctrine or discipline should be referred to the Bishops of the Provinces, whose opinion expressed by a majority should bind the Court.

In the eight essays which make up *Establishment in England* the Dean of the Arches has made a contribution to the right understanding of the questions involved which no serious student of the Church's position can afford to neglect. One essay dates from the time of the Commission of 1883, another from the Disestablishment controversy of 1887, a third from 1904, a fourth was written in 1916 for the report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and State, two others appeared in 1929 and 1930, and two are new, *The Present Outlook* and *The Present Relations of Church and State*.

There have always been in England parties which might be called

Erastian and Ultramontane. Sir Lewis leans towards the Erastians, but he is too sound a Churchman not to resent "an intrusion of the State into an affair of the Church," such as when, under the P.W.R. Act of 1874, his own appointments from the Archbishops of Dean of the Arches, Judge of the Chancery Court of York, and Master of the Faculties, had to receive the approval of the Sovereign by sign manual.

Historically as well as legally this is a valuable book, but why the statement on p. 5: "The nation transferred these things" (cathedrals, parsonages, etc.) "from their old Roman Catholic users to the Church of England possessors of them in Elizabeth's time"? Perhaps 6 per cent. of the beneficed clergy were deprived for all causes in the first half-dozen years of Elizabeth, and perhaps about half of these were Marianists.

A. W. GOODMAN.

ALEXANDRINE TEACHING ON THE UNIVERSE. By R. D. Tollinton, D.D.
Allen and Unwin. 5s.

When the Summer School for Biblical Study was first held at Newnham College, Cambridge, sceptical onlookers were much amused at the idea of elderly spinsters playing at being students, and listening to tepid addresses from some "dear vicar," in the belief that they were acquiring serious information about the Bible. If any such sceptics still remain, let them read Dr. Tollinton's four lectures on Alexandrine Teaching of the Universe, and respect the ladies of the Summer School for the strenuous intellectual effort that they were willing to make in hearing them.

The book is not easy reading, but it is well written, thoughtful and very informative. Dr. Tollinton knows how to bring Alexandria, as seen at the height of its glory, vividly before our eyes. "Its mixed population—Egyptian, Jewish, Greek—rose to something like a million. Round the royal palaces lingered memories of the Ptolemies, not least of Cleopatra, the last of the dynasty. . . . Crowded audiences filled the places of entertainment and sometimes also the lecture rooms. . . . The stream of visitors was constant—students, traders, lecturers, ship-owners, Roman officials, courtezans. Every night the blaze from the Pharos lighthouse sent its guiding, warning radiance over the Mediterranean. . . . The people were passionate and excitable, going mad over horse-races, and losing all control under the influence of music."

In such an environment the great philosophers and theologians worked out their theories of the universe and of man. Unlike modern thinkers, who feel that they are on safer ground when they begin with the Known and hope to build a tower reaching to the Unknown, the Alexandrines preferred to speculate on the Nature of the Deity, and thence to deduce facts concerning the visible world and man. Often their God was so remote that He became a mere abstraction, and demiurges and lesser divinities had to be assumed, in order that God might not vanish completely from His own universe by losing all touch with man.

Dr. Tollinton has divided his book into four lectures—Transcendence, Mediation, the Universe, and Man—and in each one he interestingly contrasts Alexandrine with modern views. He leaves us finally with the impression that the human mind, whether it starts from known facts or abstract speculation, is unable of itself to solve the problems of the Universe. We need the guidance of God—in a word, Revelation.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

HILDEBRAND (GREGORY VII.). By A. J. Macdonald, D.D. Methuen and Co. 7s. 6d.

Hildebrand emerges from the pages of Dr. Macdonald's volume in the series devoted to Great Mediæval Churchmen as a rather less considerable figure than might have been expected. The Archbishop of York classes Hildebrand with Aquinas and Innocent III. as one who cherished a universal view of life, striving to bring all its manifestations under one majestic scheme. Dante might be added to the trio, extending the vision to include the future life.

To Dr. Macdonald, Hildebrand is by no means so dominant a character. Study of his letters to Henry IV. reveals him as a typical ecclesiastic, bent on extending the power of the Church, but without the universal outlook with which he has been credited. Nevertheless we feel that Dr. Macdonald does some injustice to Gregory when he describes him as attempting "to rule an Empire with the gestures of an Archdeacon."

The somewhat paradoxical statement as to Canossa that "neither Gregory nor Henry was under any illusion as to its significance as a royal victory" is probably accurate, despite the dramatic "penance" undergone by the Emperor.

To present the circumstances in any lucid form is a task which might baffle the most practised writer, and Dr. Macdonald has crowded his canvas with too many characters for the development of the Papal or the Imperial policy to stand out clearly. The "general reader," for whom this series is partly designed, will find it difficult to trace the main line of development: the vast assemblage of characters is indicated by the nine pages of index, which is practically a catalogue of their names. That is not the fault of the author, who has attempted to condense into 246 pages a mass of material requiring to be set out at greater length.

It is doubtful whether any important modification is likely to be made in posterity's estimate of Hildebrand. Despite the new angle from which Dr. Macdonald has studied him, there is no appreciable difference to be discerned in his motives, though there is less still in his methods than might have been looked for. But will many assent to Dr. Macdonald's remark, "Like Charles I., he was no martyr"? Both were surely martyrs to their zeal for the glory of God and the welfare of God's Church, however these may have been confused with untenable political theories or unworthy diplomatic methods.

MARCUS DONOVAN.

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